SPECIAL OPERATIONS IN A 5G WORLD: CAN WE STILL HIDE IN THE SHADOWS? by Jones, Mason P. & McCaslin, Erica L.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
DSpace Repository
Theses and Dissertations 1. Thesis and Dissertation Collection, all items
2020-06
SPECIAL OPERATIONS IN A 5G WORLD: CAN
WE STILL HIDE IN THE SHADOWS?
Jones, Mason P.; McCaslin, Erica L.
Monterey, CA; Naval Postgraduate School
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/65560
This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United
States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the
United States.








SPECIAL OPERATIONS IN A 5G WORLD: 
CAN WE STILL HIDE IN THE SHADOWS? 
by 
Mason P. Jones and Erica L. McCaslin 
June 2020 
Thesis Advisor: Leo J. Blanken 
Second Reader: Justin P. Davis 
 
Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE  Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 
 Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing 
instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of 
information.  Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including 
suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 
Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction 
Project (0704-0188) Washington, DC 20503. 
 1. AGENCY USE ONLY 
(Leave blank)  
2. REPORT DATE 
 June 2020  
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
 Master's thesis 
 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 
SPECIAL OPERATIONS IN A 5G WORLD: CAN WE STILL HIDE IN THE 
SHADOWS? 
 5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
 
  
 6. AUTHOR(S) Mason P. Jones and Erica L. McCaslin 
 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 93943-5000 
 8. PERFORMING 
ORGANIZATION REPORT 
NUMBER 
 9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND 
ADDRESS(ES) 
Asymmetric Warfare Group, Fort Meade, MD 20755 
 10. SPONSORING / 
MONITORING AGENCY 
REPORT NUMBER 
 11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the 
official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 
 12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 
Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.  
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
 A 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)     
 The arrival of “fifth generation” (5G) telecommunications technology is poised to fundamentally alter 
societies in numerous ways. Changes to telecommunications technologies and infrastructure will enable 5G 
networks to integrate information and collaborate at unprecedented levels, enabling leaps in artificial 
intelligence, human-machine teaming, and other data-based technologies. However, the thrill of emerging 
technologies and associated capabilities comes at a cost in terms of security vulnerabilities. Just as 5G will 
alter our daily lives, it will also modify our approach to Special Operations Forces (SOF) missions; bolstered 
by artificial intelligence, there is great potential for an adversary to aggregate and exploit data on a massive 
scale. Using qualitative evidence and deducing operational implications, this thesis develops a holistic 
framework of 5G networks, explores how this changing technological reality impacts signature 
management, and identifies the threats and opportunities within this domain. Ultimately, special operations 
forces will be forced to operate within high-risk telecommunications network environments, threatening 
their ability to sufficiently maintain operational security and manage their signatures. Near-term 
recommendations—data reduction and protection, force education, and network analysis during mission 
planning—and long-term research efforts—trusted communications, signature reduction, and deception 
techniques—may help mitigate these risks. 
 14. SUBJECT TERMS 
5G, Special Operations Forces, SOF, signature management, operational security, deception, 
emerging technology, advertising technology, technical surveillance, China, Huawei 
 15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES 
 109 
 16. PRICE CODE 




 18. SECURITY 
CLASSIFICATION OF THIS 
PAGE 
Unclassified 








NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89) 
Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 
i 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
ii 
Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. 
SPECIAL OPERATIONS IN A 5G WORLD: CAN WE STILL HIDE IN THE 
SHADOWS? 
Mason P. Jones 
Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy 
BS, U.S. Air Force Academy, 2005 
 
Erica L. McCaslin 
Major, United States Air Force 
BS, University of Washington, 2006 
MBA, Trident University International, 2014 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
MASTER OF SCIENCE IN DEFENSE ANALYSIS  
(IRREGULAR WARFARE) 
from the 
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
June 2020 
Approved by: Leo J. Blanken 
 Advisor 
 Justin P. Davis 
 Second Reader 
 Kalev I. Sepp 
 Chair, Department of Defense Analysis 
iii 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
iv 
ABSTRACT 
 The arrival of “fifth generation” (5G) telecommunications technology is poised to 
fundamentally alter societies in numerous ways. Changes to telecommunications 
technologies and infrastructure will enable 5G networks to integrate information and 
collaborate at unprecedented levels, enabling leaps in artificial intelligence, 
human-machine teaming, and other data-based technologies. However, the thrill of 
emerging technologies and associated capabilities comes at a cost in terms of security 
vulnerabilities. Just as 5G will alter our daily lives, it will also modify our approach to 
Special Operations Forces (SOF) missions; bolstered by artificial intelligence, there is 
great potential for an adversary to aggregate and exploit data on a massive scale. Using 
qualitative evidence and deducing operational implications, this thesis develops a holistic 
framework of 5G networks, explores how this changing technological reality impacts 
signature management, and identifies the threats and opportunities within this domain. 
Ultimately, special operations forces will be forced to operate within high-risk 
telecommunications network environments, threatening their ability to sufficiently 
maintain operational security and manage their signatures. Near-term 
recommendations—data reduction and protection, force education, and network analysis 
during mission planning—and long-term research efforts—trusted communications, 
signature reduction, and deception techniques—may help mitigate these risks. 
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The impact of “fifth generation” (5G) telecommunications technology is poised to 
fundamentally alter societies in several ways. When download speeds are boosted by a 
factor of one hundred, end-to-end latency is reduced to less than a millisecond, and network 
capacity is increased to support one hundred times the additional endpoint users and 
devices, we will see a new era in the digital age significantly impacting the way we 
communicate and how the world is connected.1 Changes to telecommunications 
technologies and infrastructure will enable 5G networks to integrate and collaborate with 
information at unprecedented levels, enabling leaps and bounds in the use of artificial 
intelligence (AI), human-machine teaming, and other data-based technologies.  
While a single “killer app” has yet to emerge, the applications powered by the 
expected data rates, the massive amount of connections, and edge computing will enable a 
range of use-cases that were previously theoretical. It may soon be commonplace for a 
doctor to remotely perform surgery from thousands of miles away, utilizing augmented 
reality informed by a healthcare database to diagnose and suggest a course of treatment.2 
The Internet-of-Things (IoT) will soon have the capacity and latency to support a 
metropolitan-level network of self-driving vehicles, altering the efficiency and safety of 
daily commutes. A hyper-enabled soldier may soon have real-time threat and intelligence 
analysis available on an Android/Tactical Assault Kit (ATAK)-enabled device, increasing 
force situational awareness and reducing time required to make mission-critical decisions. 
Despite the opportunities to enhance the warfighting abilities of our soldiers, the thrill of 
emerging technologies and associated capabilities comes at a cost. Each capability is paired 
with a specific signature that, if not properly managed, may put the end-user and their 
mission at significant risk.  
 
1 Patrick Agyapong et al., “Design Considerations for a 5G Network Architecture,” IEEE 
Communications Magazine 52, no. 11 (November 2014): 4, https://doi.org/10.1109/MCOM.2014.6957145. 
2 Jennifer Alsever, “How 5G Will Fundamentally Change Everything You Know About Mobile 




There are several ways in which the 5G world will be characterized by the IoT, 
geolocation, and the aggregation of individualized data. However, in our everyday lives, 
AI coupled with increasingly ubiquitous technical surveillance, mollified by the offer of 
convenience, is beginning to target individual consumers. The exploitation of this data 
within commerce is driven by advertising technology (ADTECH). In a 5G world, the 
potential for this practice to become more targeted is bolstered by the immense volumes of 
data coupled with extremely low latency and high bandwidth.3 Though the analysis of a 
consumer’s data in conjunction with their digital and physical signature may make their 
life more convenient, it also puts a consumer at risk of manipulation and exploitation. Take 
for example, a future 5G-enabled commute: 
After comparing her vital signs with historical data on a cloud-based 
network to determine an ideal wakeup time, Sally’s Bluetooth-enabled 
smart watch initiates her alarm, optimizing her circadian rhythm while still 
ensuring she has adequate time for her typical morning routine. Her 
apartment, aided by the Internet-of-Things (IoT), streamlines her morning 
routine. Prior to her wakeup alarm, her watch conveniently adjusted the 
thermometer, started the coffee pot, and even fed her dog, Spark. Her 
refrigerator, noting that Sally is low on milk, frozen fruit, and her favorite, 
locally sourced avocados, seamlessly reorders these items in addition to the 
few grocery items she put on her virtual shopping list for tonight’s dinner. 
After sipping her coffee, Sally hops into her network-connected shower, 
automatically set to a perfect 105-degrees, followed by a smart-mirror 
beauty routine, and steps out of her apartment to embark on her commute 
to work. 
As she leaves her apartment, the geolocation change of Sally’s 
phone is registered by her apartment’s security system. Knowing her typical 
routine, a self-driving car service is ordered, arriving just as Sally reaches 
 
3 Vandita Grover, “7 Ways 5G Will Help Advertising Evolve in 2019,” Martech Advisor (blog), April 
5, 2019, https://www.martechadvisor.com/articles/ads/7-ways-5g-advertising-evolve-2019/. 
3 
the curb. A camera connected to a facial recognition database confirms 
Sally’s identity, charges the ride to her virtual account, and initiates her 
commute. Sensing that Sally is still feeling a little fatigued, her phone 
suggests a quick detour to visit her favorite café. Sally agrees and her 
vehicle is rerouted automatically. 
Gig-a-Bites, wirelessly noting the approach of a regular customer 
and having purchased consumer data to include the spending habits of their 
patrons, not only prepares Sally’s favorite soy matcha latte, but also cues 
the café screens to targeted advertisements aligned with her specific wants 
and desires. Sally finds her latte at the barista’s counter and returns to her 
self-driving chariot. Bolstered by the efficiency and accuracy of the 
maintenance of her caffeine addiction, Sally’s workday is off to a good start.  
Sally arrives at work and finds her favorite park bench to set up for 
the day. Working remotely, Sally is able to access her cloud-based work 
server, gaining access to her email, video teleconferencing, and data 
processing applications. Enabled by a 5G network and edge computing, 
Sally, an industrial engineer and factory supervisor, ensures the machinery 
and processes in her factory are operating at peak efficiency, inspects the 
factory floor via augmented reality (AR), and makes wireless adjustments 
as required. From her sunny park bench, Sally is also able to access and 
monitor security patrols, although the partnered autonomous security 
system would notify both Sally and local security guards of 
any intrusion.  
Upon completion of Sally’s day, she decides to incorporate a 
workout into her commute. Sally is directed to the nearest ride-share 
bicycle, which automatically unlocks after registering Sally’s digital 
signature, and she commences her ride home. On the way, the local grocer, 
having previously received her shopping request, is alerted to her pending 
arrival and is waiting outside with her order as she passes by. Enabled by 
the aggregation and analysis of her data, Sally’s workday is complete. 
4 
Sally’s story could easily continue with more examples of how a 5G world would 
enhance her day-to-day life; however, what is missing from this narrative are the sacrifices 
in privacy and security that Sally made to enjoy these conveniences.4  
While proposed 5G infrastructures have some inherent security built in, much of 
data security, and therefore signature management, will still depend on the individual user. 
Just as 5G will alter the way we go about our daily personal lives, it will necessarily change 
our approach to special operations forces (SOF) missions, whether on or off the battlefield. 
Both societies and militaries have grown addicted to technology while the lines between 
war, conflict, competition, and peace continue to blur.5 It is unrealistic to think that 
individuals or entire units can remain concealed as they once were. The implications of an 
opponent’s capacity to aggregate and utilize personal data and metadata on a massive scale 
is worth investigating. Will it be possible for an adversary in the future to overcome our 
operational security and anticipate combat operations by weaponizing advertising 
technology? With that question in mind, this thesis aims to provide a foundational 
understanding of the proposed 5G infrastructure and capabilities, the proliferation of these 
networks by our adversaries, an appreciation for how this changing technological reality 
might impact signature management as well as to recognize threats and opportunities 
within this domain. 
A. PURPOSE 
To prepare our forces and maintain the competitive advantage during future 
conflicts, it is important to understand the impact of emerging technologies upon special 
operations. The U.S. military often approaches most problems with a reliance on faster 
innovation—until recently, this confidence in advanced technologies has preserved the 
advantage the United States enjoys over her adversaries and their proxies. The last two 
 
4 Shoshana Zuboff, “You Are Now Remotely Controlled,” The New York Times, January 24, 2020, 
sec. Opinion, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/24/opinion/sunday/surveillance-capitalism.html. 
5 Steven Bryant, “The Dangers of an Over-Reliance on Technology” (master’s thesis, Norfolk, VA, 
Joint Advanced Warfighting School, 2011), 1–3; Sergio Miracola, “Chinese Hybrid Warfare,” Italian 
Institute for International Political Studies, December 21, 2018, 
https://www.ispionline.it/en/pubblicazione/chinese-hybrid-warfare-21853. 
5 
decades of conflict against non-state actors around the world has solidified these 
assumptions within our doctrine. However, as a result of this technological asymmetry, our 
forces have a near-complete reliance on Global Positioning System (GPS) navigation, 
communications systems that rely on robust infrastructure, weapons systems dependent on 
a large logistical footprint, and have grown accustomed to the normal emissions of 
uniquely U.S. military signatures.6 This approach may be significantly challenged by a 
more sophisticated adversary and it is likely that the United States and her allies have 
atrophied in their ability to fight a technological peer.7 Anticipating a nexus between great 
power competition, 5G telecommunication technology, and advanced artificial 
intelligence, this thesis will seek to offer implications of operating within an environment 
proliferated with 5G technology. While this thesis will remain largely descriptive, we will 
also strive to provide recommendations for future research to assist SOF operations, 
highlighting the gap between our current capabilities and the rapidly evolving 
technological environment. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
As the technological reality changes for our forces on the battlefield, several 
research questions have emerged relative to the impact of next generation 
telecommunications technology on SOF operations. Key questions this thesis will 
explore are: 
• What are the implications of 5G technology for signature management?  
• Can special operations forces employ deception tactics in concert with 
signature management to mitigate operational and tactical risks posed by 
advanced telecommunications networks? 
• What are the implications of the rapid fielding of 5G in the developing 
world?  
 
6 Bryant, “The Dangers of an Over-Reliance on Technology,” 22–24, 29–30. 
7 Keven P Coyle, “U.S. Military Technology Dependence: The Hidden Vulnerability to National 
Security” (master’s thesis, Norfolk, VA, Joint Advanced Warfighting School, 2016), 1–3; Bryant, “The 
Dangers of an Over-Reliance on Technology,” 1–3. 
6 
• Within the 5G environment, can special operations forces manage their 
physical and digital signatures?  
• What further research and analysis is required to ensure the United States 
adequately applies sound signature management strategies within a 5G 
environment?  
C. APPROACH 
Using qualitative evidence and deducing operational implications from current and 
projected 5G technical characteristics, this thesis will focus on developing a holistic 
framework of 5G networks for the SOF operator. Ubiquitous technical surveillance and 
advertising technology-based threats will serve as the backdrop of threats assessed 
throughout this thesis; however, in the context of changing technological realities, 
principles of signature management and deception will be used to focus recommendations 
into avenues for further research relevant to small unit teams. 
D. ORGANIZATION 
Organized into five chapters, this thesis will begin with an introduction into the 5G 
world and end with specific implications of this emerging technological reality and specific 
recommendations. Chapter II surveys 5G networks and capabilities, providing the technical 
framework needed for SOF operators and decision-makers to apply signature management 
within operational planning and assessment. Chapter III will look specifically at the 
Chinese “Digital Silk Road” strategy and their rapid proliferation of 5G technology, 
providing multiple vignettes showcasing the implications of Chinese 5G expansion.8 
Chapter IV begins with a discussion of signatures, signature management, and the role of 
deception to manage information. A hypothetical special operations vignette illustrates the 
challenges 5G technology presents to signature management and sets the stage for a 
discussion of the overall implications. After distilling the previous discussions into a threat 
model, the final chapter will offer recommendations and future research opportunities.   
 
8 Yash Mishra, “Here Are the Countries That Allowed Huawei to Build 5G,” Huawei Central (blog), 
August 30, 2019, https://www.huaweicentral.com/here-are-the-countries-that-allowed-huawei-to-build-5g-
list/. 
7 
II. A SURVEY OF FIFTH GENERATION (5G) 
TELECOMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY 
The 5G world will be a collaborative ecosystem, and the role of what each 
of us will do in that remains to be thought through.9  
—Borje Ekholm, CEO Ericsson 
As fifth generation (5G) networks and associated technologies begin to emerge this 
year, the final framework is still undetermined. This type of progressive roll out is not 
abnormal in the development of next generation telecommunications technology; as the 
developmental process unfolds, the standards evolve from theoretical to practical, often 
based on operational testing, infrastructure and market limitations, and advances and 
constraints of the technology. What is known, however, is that the emergence of 5G 
capabilities will have dramatic impacts on civilian and military operations alike. The 
traditional divide between civilian and military technological capabilities will become 
blurred and opportunities within the civilian sector may also present threats within the 
defense sector. To better understand these opportunities and threats, this chapter will 
explore the evolution and fundamentals of mobile wireless technology, the technology 
supporting the 5G framework, and the end-user devices and capabilities that industry is 
striving for. Along the way, we will highlight key differences from the existing 3G/4G LTE 
network, however, an assessment of the implications and recommendations will be 
reserved for later chapters.  
A. EVOLUTION OF MOBILE WIRELESS TECHNOLOGY 
Mobile wireless technology has changed the way the world is connected. Though 
its evolution has been steady since the 1970s, the impact of this technology has had varied 
and far-reaching impacts on the world. Not only has mobile wireless technology altered 
telecommunications, it has fundamentally changed the way the world interacts socially, the 
 




speed at which information is exchanged, and the nature of commerce. Once again, the 
next generation promises to expand the impact telecommunications has on the world; 
however, in addition to building on existing capabilities, 5G will make some fundamental 
changes to the wireless networking framework. Figure 1 quickly sums up the additive 
capabilities that were adapted in each successive generation. 
 
Figure 1. Cellular Technology Evolution10 
1G. Development of cellular networks and mobile wireless technology began in the 
1970s and debuted in the 1980s.11 While first generation (1G) technology lacked the 
sophistication and security of the today’s frameworks, the ability to transmit data on a radio 
network was groundbreaking.12 Gupta and Jha describe these networks in their IEEE 5G 
Survey as vulnerable, unreliable, and lacking the necessary capacity; data transmission 
peaked at 2.4kbps, supporting voice calls (and limited data transfer) which were vulnerable 
 
10 Source: Shruti Jain, “Mobile VNI Forecast 2017–2022: 5G Emerges and Is Here to Stay!!,” Cisco 
Blogs (blog), February 26, 2019, https://blogs.cisco.com/sp/mobile-vni-forecast-2017-2022-5g-emerges. 
11 Sunny Classroom, “5G Cellular Networks: 6 New Technologies,” 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hQvHNVRv_ms; A. Gupta and R. K. Jha, “A Survey of 5G Network: 
Architecture and Emerging Technologies,” IEEE Access 3 (2015): 1207, 
https://doi.org/10.1109/ACCESS.2015.2461602. 
12 Gupta and Jha, “A Survey of 5G Network,” 1207; Milo Medin and Gilman Louie, The 5G 
Ecosystem: Risks & Opportunities for DOD (Defense Innovation Board, 2019), 5. 
 
9 
to third-party interception.13 Medin and Louie further distinguish the system by its analog 
“hand-offs” via a distributed network of base stations.14 
2G. The 1990s saw wireless technology improve in its second generation (2G) 
with the introduction of digital technology.15 Data rates improved dramatically (up to 
200kbps in later iterations of 2G) and the standard introduced rudimentary digital 
encryption.16 End-users gained additional capabilities including Short Message Service 
(SMS) and email.17  
3G. The 2000s ushered in the third generation (3G) of cellular networking, merging 
internet protocol (IP) services with mobile access and supporting initial data transfer rates 
up to 2Mbps.18 The inclusion of data packet-switching enabled video calling, data 
streaming, and internet access. Current 3G networks have increased data rates up to 
1Gbps.19 During this time, the Third Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) collaborated 
on common standards for 3G networks and end-user technology to align worldwide 
compatibility.20 This international partnership continues throughout 4G/LTE standards as 
well as the current efforts to develop 5G. 
4G/LTE. Fourth generation (4G)/Long-term Evolution technology (LTE) enabled 
complete reliance on IP, a ten-fold improvement in data transfer rate, and a mobile 
networking experience comparable to Wi-Fi or traditional internet connections (services 
include Digital Video Broadcasting, video chat, and mobile TV).21  
 
13 Gupta and Jha, “A Survey of 5G Network,” 1207. 
14 Medin and Louie, The 5G Ecosystem: Risks & Opportunities for DOD, 5. 
15 Gupta and Jha, “A Survey of 5G Network,” 1207. 
16 Medin and Louie, The 5G Ecosystem: Risks & Opportunities for DOD, 5. 
17 Gupta and Jha, “A Survey of 5G Network,” 1207. 
18 Gupta and Jha, 1207. 
19  Medin and Louie, The 5G Ecosystem: Risks & Opportunities for DOD, 5 
20  Medin and Louie, 16.  
21 Gupta and Jha, 1208; Medin and Louie, The 5G Ecosystem: Risks & Opportunities for DOD, 5–6. 
 
10 
5G. As the 3GPP continues to deliberate on the future standards for fifth generation 
(5G) cellular networks, the eventual architecture of 5G is yet to be determined. However, 
there are several capability challenges that the industry agrees that 5G should meet; these 
capabilities will “enable enhanced mobile broadband (eMBB), massive internet of things 
(IoT) or massive machine type communications (mMTC), and ultra-high reliable and low 
latency communications (URLLC) services.”22 Major adaptations that will enable these 
services include massive multiple input multiple output (mMIMO), or the ability to connect 
an extraordinary number of devices, and the utilization of millimeter waves (mmWaves) 
that will introduce untapped bandwidth and dramatically increase network data rates.23 
B. 5G ADVANCEMENTS 
The transition to 5G could fundamentally advance consumer, industry, and military 
applications, altering the way we work, play, and integrate with our environment. Dramatic 
increases in the number of connections, enhanced network capacity, and ultra-low latency 
are three primary capabilities that will be enriched by this next generation technology; 
however, this will not be possible without significant changes to technology and 
infrastructure. Common among a few works, there are four challenges or criteria that are 
generally accepted by industry leaders and developers to meet the threshold of next 
generation (5G) telecommunication technology as well as relevant to our signature 
management discussion.24 These include:  
• Massive number of connections (x10-100) 
 
22 Gordon J. Sutton et al., “Enabling Technologies for Ultra-Reliable and Low Latency 
Communications: From PHY and MAC Layer Perspectives,” IEEE Communications Surveys Tutorials 21, 
no. 3 (Third Quarter 2019): 2488, https://doi.org/10.1109/COMST.2019.2897800; Agyapong et al., 
“Design Considerations for a 5G Network Architecture,” 4; “Public Policy Position: 5G Spectrum” 
(Huawei, 2017), 6, https://www-file.huawei.com/-/media/CORPORATE/PDF/public-
policy/public_policy_position_5g_spectrum.pdf. 
23 Agyapong et al., “Design Considerations for a 5G Network Architecture,” 4; Medin and Louie, The 
5G Ecosystem: Risks & Opportunities for DOD, 9–10. 
24 Agyapong et al., “Design Considerations for a 5G Network Architecture,” 4. 
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Cellular IoT devices (e.g., wearable devices, smart home appliances, 
autonomous vehicles, sensors, and so on) are estimated to reach 3.5 billion 
worldwide by 2023, increasing from 700 million in 2017.25 Estimates 
predict that the cumulative architecture, frequency, and antenna 
advancements of 5G will allow the network to grow from 1000 
connections/km2 to over a million connections/km2.26 
• Bandwidth (Rate increase x10) 
Bandwidth, which is directly related to data rates, suggests the volume of 
data transferred in a unit of time, generally measured in bits per second. 
Data consumption is exponentially increasing worldwide; 3G/4G networks 
expect data usage to increase from 20 exabytes in 2018 to over 80 exabytes 
by 2023.27 5G networks may meet these demands by utilizing greater 
frequency bands within the largely untapped high-frequency range. Doing 
so will provide 1~10 Gbps data rates for the densely populated massive 
number of connections; this represents at least a nearly ten-fold increase in 
speed compared to LTE’s 150 Mbps peak rate.28  
• Latency (<1ms Roundtrip) 
 
25 Agyapong et al., 2; “Ericsson Mobility Report” (Stockholm, Sweden: Ericsson, June 2018), 16, 
https://www.ericsson.com/assets/local/mobility-report/documents/2018/ericsson-mobility-report-june-
2018.pdf. 
26 Agyapong et al., “Design Considerations for a 5G Network Architecture,” 4; “Difference Between 
4G and 5G,” accessed February 7, 2020, https://www.rfwireless-world.com/Terminology/4G-vs-5G-
difference-between-4G-and-5G.html; Mamta Agiwal, Navrati Saxena, and Abhishek Roy, “Towards 
Connected Living: 5G Enabled Internet of Things (IoT),” IETE Technical Review 36, no. 2 (March 4, 
2019): 196, https://doi.org/10.1080/02564602.2018.1444516; Mamta Agiwal, Abhishek Roy, and Navrati 
Saxena, “Next Generation 5G Wireless Networks: A Comprehensive Survey,” IEEE Communications 
Surveys & Tutorials 18, no. 3 (2016): 1618. 
27 “Ericsson Mobility Report,” 14. 




Latency, generally measured in milliseconds, represents the time required 
for data to travel from the source to its destination and back. Reducing 
LTE’s top latency by ten-fold, 5G networks will see 1ms roundtrip 
latency.29 Enabling emerging technologies that require almost immediate 
feedback, such as autonomous vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) communication or 
battlefield surgery via augmented or virtual reality, latency of less than 1ms 
is critical to near real-time applications within 5G networks.30 
• Quality of Experience 
Extremely low latency, high bandwidth, traffic optimization techniques, 
and at-the-edge computing are 5G characteristics that promise an improved 
and more consistent quality of experience.31 To provide the necessary 
quality, intelligent network optimization will push more resources 
(bandwidth, latency, etc.) to demanding applications such as video 
streaming or augmented reality; other, less demanding applications such as 
the internet-of-things (IoT) will be allocated fewer resources.32 From the 
end-user, success is defined to be when perceived availability is 99.999% 
and coverage extends to 100% of user locations.33 
C. FUNDAMENTAL TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGES 
To achieve these important criteria, there are several required upgrades or additions 
to the existing infrastructure as well as needed scientific research to develop, test, and 
implement the technology. The allocation of new radio wavelength bands, alterations to 
the cellular base station architecture and network control, as well as the design of smart 
 
29 Agiwal, Roy, and Saxena, 1618. 
30 Agyapong et al., “Design Considerations for a 5G Network Architecture,” 5; Kimberly Underwood, 
“5G for Warfighters,” SIGNAL Magazine, June 1, 2019, https://www.afcea.org/content/5g-warfighters. 
31 Agyapong et al., “Design Considerations for a 5G Network Architecture,” 7. 
32 Agyapong et al., 7. 
33 Agiwal, Roy, and Saxena, “Next Generation 5G Wireless Networks: A Comprehensive Survey,” 
1618. 
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and directional antennas are only a few of the technical challenges 5G innovators will face. 
The Appendix provides a more in-depth discussion of these developments; however, the 
remainder of this section will strive to provide a brief overview. 
1. Wavelength Bands  
As more wireless technology is added to the network, the already overcrowded 
frequency bands risk reducing the overall network capability and quality of experience. 
In response, scientists and industry leaders are exploring other frequency bands in addition 
to techniques for more efficient use of current bands. Distinctive low, medium, and 
high bands are under examination, each offering unique opportunities and drawbacks 
(Figure 2).34  
 
Figure 2. Multi-Layer Frequency Overlay on 5G Use-Cases35 
While the majority of our telecommunication currently occurs within the low 
wavelength bands (3kHz–3GHz), the authors of the 5G telecommunication standards are 
 
34 “Public Policy Position: 5G Spectrum,” 6; Medin and Louie, The 5G Ecosystem: Risks & 
Opportunities for DOD, 12. 
35Adapted from “Public Policy Position: 5G Spectrum,” 6; Cradlepoint 5G Strategy Group, The 5G 
for Business Guidebook: A Guide to Understanding and Exploring the Pathway to 5G, 2nd ed. (Boise, ID: 
Cradlepoint, 2020), 7–8, www.cradlepoint.com/5G. 
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primarily assessing the less-crowded medium and high bands for enhanced mobile 
broadband.36 This will allow a simultaneous transition of less bandwidth-demanding 
technology to the crowded lower bands (e.g., IoT devices that require low data rates).37 
Currently, there is some debate over which of the wavelength bands will offer the most 
promise for mobile broadband; the United States continues to pursue the highest, mmWave 
bands (>24GHz) while other nations, such as China, have begun to implement within the 
sub-6 bands (3-6GHz).38 The trade-offs associated with each band are summarized in 
Figure 3; balancing capacity and latency with wide-area coverage and building penetrations 
will require a blend of each band.39 
 
 
36 “Radio-Frequency Spectrum,” in Encyclopedia Britannica, 2013, 
https://www.britannica.com/science/radio-frequency-spectrum; Cradlepoint 5G Strategy Group, The 5G for 
Business Guidebook: A Guide to Understanding and Exploring the Pathway to 5G, 7; Agiwal, Roy, and 
Saxena, “Next Generation 5G Wireless Networks: A Comprehensive Survey,” 1618. 
37 “Radio-Frequency Spectrum”; Cradlepoint 5G Strategy Group, The 5G for Business Guidebook: A 
Guide to Understanding and Exploring the Pathway to 5G, 7. 
38 Sunny Classroom, “5G Cellular Networks”; “Public Policy Position: 5G Spectrum,” 10; Anne 
Morris, “Ericsson Hails 5G Test on Another Sub-6 GHz Band,” SDxCentral, January 14, 2019, 
https://www.sdxcentral.com/articles/news/ericsson-hails-5g-test-on-another-sub-6-ghz-band/2019/01/; T-
Mobile, “Built for the 5G Future: T-Mobile Opens New Device Lab,” August 20, 2019, https://www.t-
mobile.com/news/5g-device-lab. 
39 Paula Gilbert, “Spectrum for 5G Will Ensure Investment in Africa,” ITWeb, November 20, 2018, 
sec. Telecom, https://www.itweb.co.za/content/dgp45qaGWaD7X9l8. 
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Figure 3. 5G Spectrum Trade-Offs40 
2. Network Architecture 
The current radio access network architecture is largely base station centric with 
systematically placed macro base stations.41 However, the higher frequency bands 
identified for 5G telecommunication will require a much denser architecture of base 
stations as well as a massive number of cells and antennae; this network design will help 
overcome the low propagation and high interference characteristics of the medium and high 
bands.42 This architecture will range from macro-cells for wide-area coverage down to 
femto-cell deployments for dense urban coverage.43 However, it is this architecture that 
will provide massive amounts of data and ultra-low latency to an incredible number of 
devices.44 
3. Changes to Antenna Technology 
The shorter, high frequency waves proposed for the medium and high bands will 
require closer, line-of-sight signals to maintain a connection.45 Although the negative wave 
characteristics drive a dense network architecture, this dense layout of antennae combined 
with massive multiple input multiple output (mMIMO) technology and nimble antenna 
pathways to maintain adequate line-of-sight signal strength (e.g., spatial diversity, 
multiplexing, and beamforming) will ensure the immense number of connections are 
supported.46 
 
40 Source: Gilbert. 
41 Agiwal, Roy, and Saxena, “Next Generation 5G Wireless Networks: A Comprehensive Survey,” 
1620. 
42 Agiwal, Roy, and Saxena, 1621. 
43 Agiwal, Roy, and Saxena, 1621. 
44 Agyapong et al., “Design Considerations for a 5G Network Architecture,” 4–5; Agiwal, Roy, and 
Saxena, “Next Generation 5G Wireless Networks: A Comprehensive Survey,” 1627. 
45 Agiwal, Roy, and Saxena, “Next Generation 5G Wireless Networks: A Comprehensive Survey,” 
1621. 
46 Agiwal, Roy, and Saxena, 1621; Qualcomm, “How 5G Massive MIMO Transforms Your Mobile 




D. 5G IN ACTION 
Depending on your perspective, 5G may mean something completely different to 
you than it does to your neighbor. For some, 5G means greater bandwidth. For others, it 
provides ultra-low latency. And for a different group, it connects a massive number of 
devices to the network. However, when these characteristics are combined, some very 
interesting capabilities and applications are enabled (Figure 4).47 Self-driving cars, 
industrial automation and other mission-critical systems will rely on ultra-reliable low-
latency communications (URLLC).48 Integrated sensors, security cameras, and machine-
type communications will depend on massive connectivity and the IoT.49 Finally, 
enhanced mobile broadband will enable data transfer rates in the 1Gbps range, allowing 
for an incredible amount of data to be transferred, aggregated, and processed in near real-
time.50 
•  
Figure 4. 5G Capabilities and Use Cases51 
 
47 “Standards,” 2020, https://futurenetworks.ieee.org/standards. 
48 IEEE Future Networks: Enabling 5G and Beyond. 
49 IEEE Future Networks: Enabling 5G and Beyond; Agiwal, Saxena, and Roy, “Towards Connected 
Living: 5G Enabled Internet of Things (IoT),” 191. 
50 IEEE Future Networks: Enabling 5G and Beyond, “Standards”; Medin and Louie, The 5G 
Ecosystem: Risks & Opportunities for DOD, 9. 
51 Source: IEEE Future Networks: Enabling 5G and Beyond, “Standards.” 
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Though the standards are still being determined, the industry has generally agreed 
on the capability requirements and have begun to move forward on implementation. 
Already, 5G is available in several cities worldwide as providers as well as their state-
sponsors continue to compete in the telecommunications domain.52 As 5G proliferates 
around the world, devices and applications will soon follow; applications such as 
augmented reality, smart cities, and industrial automation that have stalled under the 
current telecommunications regime will be more empowered and capable as more robust 
5G networks are realized.53 
Much of the discussion relative to capabilities and applications is driven, not 
surprisingly, by civilian demand and industry. However, many of these same capabilities 
can be adapted for military applications. If integrated with artificial intelligence (AI) or 
machine automation, intelligence collection and analysis could be done at the edge on the 
battlefield.54 Enabled by enhanced mobile broadband and ultra-reliable low-latency 
battlefield capabilities, soldiers could clear an ISIS-controlled neighborhood aided by 
augmented reality, reducing the risk to themselves and civilians. Autonomous intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance drones could perform real-time route reconnaissance and 
alert the team of impending threats. However, 5G may also enable adversarial threats that 
may risk the signature management of a special operations team; ubiquitous technical 
surveillance and AI-supported advertising technology-enabled targeting may hinder a SOF 
team’s ability to protect their signature and operational security. 
 
52 Sascha Segan, “T-Mobile Announces 5G in 6 Cities: We Have the Maps,” PCMagazine, June 25, 
2019, https://www.pcmag.com/news/t-mobile-announces-5g-in-6-cities-we-have-the-maps; Eli Blumenthal, 
“AT&T Bolsters 5G Network with New Low-Band and Millimeter-Wave Markets,” CNET, December 30, 
2019, https://www.cnet.com/news/at-t-bolsters-5g-network-with-new-low-band-and-millimeter-wave-
markets/. 
53 “5G & the Future of Connectivity: 20 Industries the Tech Could Transform,” March 19, 2019, 
https://www.cbinsights.com/research/5g-technology-disrupting-industries/. 





1. Technical Surveillance 
Technical surveillance is nothing new to militaries, police, or intelligence agencies. 
Security cameras, voice and data collection, spectrum analysis, and various remote sensors 
have enabled surveillance and collection for decades. However, in a 5G regime, this type 
of surveillance will become more ubiquitous and inexpensively proliferated to state and 
non-state actors.55 At the most basic level, commercially available, benign hardware and 
software is easily accessible and the capabilities are adaptable for use by criminal and non-
state actors.56 At the high end of state-controlled technical surveillance, collection and 
analysis is deeply integrated and supported by a well-established organization to 
operationalize the data and intelligence gained.57 
While there is a bit more inherent security built into the network to protect end-to-
end information, the sheer number of devices connected to the network may introduce new 
risks to operations within an untrusted 5G network. As 5G is adopted, the ability to surveil 
the general populace as well as adversaries will grow. Geolocation, facial recognition, 
device metadata, and personal data remain vulnerable to collection and exploitation.58 
Surveillance states have already begun to monitor the most mundane actions of its citizens 
and implement the infrastructure and policies required to ensure there are no blind spots in 
the future.59 5G technology, due to the increased volume and speed at which data is 
 
55 Steven Feldstein, “The Global Expansion of AI Surveillance” (Washington, DC: Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, September 17, 2019), 1–3, 
https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/09/17/global-expansion-of-ai-surveillance-pub-79847; Niraj Chokshi, 
“How Surveillance Cameras Could Be Weaponized with A.I.,” The New York Times, June 13, 2019, sec. 
U.S., https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/13/us/aclu-surveillance-artificial-intelligence.html. 
56 Feldstein, “The Global Expansion of AI Surveillance”; Chokshi, “How Surveillance Cameras Could 
Be Weaponized with A.I.” 
57 Feldstein, “The Global Expansion of AI Surveillance”; Dinucci, “The Hidden Military Use of 5G 
Technology.” 
58 Feldstein, “The Global Expansion of AI Surveillance,” 1–2,10. 





transmitted and analyzed, as well as changes to behavioral norms, decreasing the privacy 
of the individual, may enable greater surveillance and control of populations in the future.  
This type of technical surveillance, enhanced by a 5G network, has impacts to 
signature management in the physical, electromagnetic, and behavioral domains. It will be 
possible, more than ever, to develop individual, actionable profiles from the collected data. 
In the commercial sector, this type of data is valuable to advertising and marketing firms; 
in fact, much of this type of data is already actionable against consumers in the form of 
contextual marketing powered by advertising technology (ADTECH).60 
2. Contextual Marketing Facilitated by AI-enabled ADTECH 
Though the military implications of ADTECH will be explored in follow-on 
chapters, a discussion of this technology in the civilian context will inform an 
understanding of how it may be weaponized in the future. Massive amounts of personal 
data, often freely given, are available to advertising and marketing firms and have changed 
the way industry engages with consumers. As 5G supports a more robust IoT, the amount 
and variety of data available to industry will grow, enabling personalized, contextualized, 
real-time marketing.61 Figure 5 highlights the relationship between IoT-derived personal 
information (i.e., geolocation, biometrics, etc.), environmental data, and behavioral 
preferences; through artificial intelligence, human-machine teaming, and the data 
marketplace, this information is bought, sold, distilled, and actioned upon in near 
real-time.62  
 
60 Thomas Husson, “Mobile’s Untapped Value Is in Contextual Data,” Forrester (blog), October 27, 
2014, https://go.forrester.com/blogs/14-10-27-mobiles_untapped_value_is_in_contextual_data/. 
61 Husson; Mathew Broughton, “The Future Is 5G: How New Mobile Tech Will Take Advertising 
into the 5th Generation,” Exchange Wire (blog), April 29, 2019, 
https://www.exchangewire.com/blog/2019/04/29/the-future-is-5g-how-new-mobile-tech-will-take-
advertising-into-a-fifth-dimension/; Grover, “7 Ways 5G Will Help Advertising Evolve in 2019.” 
62 Husson, “Mobile’s Untapped Value Is in Contextual Data.” 
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Figure 5. Data Utilized for Contextual Marketing63 
Google ads, refined by a user’s search history, are an early example of contextual 
marketing. However, as technology advances and behavioral norms adapt (i.e., privacy 
concerns are often ignored for convenience or participation in the online marketplace), the 
power of AI-enabled ADTECH will continue to drive growth in contextual marketing or, 
as Shoshana Zuboff refers to it, surveillance capitalism.64 Advancements in next 
generation telecommunications will allow for targeted messaging via augmented reality, 
high-speed 4K video advertising, and personalized ads on a range of IoT-connected 
devices.65 However, beyond the immediate interactions, AI-enabled ADTECH can 
anticipate consumer preferences, predict future behavior, and inject interactions based on 
this analysis.66 
 
63 Source: Husson. 
64 Husson; Shoshana Zuboff, “‘Surveillance Capitalism’ Has Gone Rogue. We Must Curb Its 
Excesses,” The Washington Post, January 24, 2019, sec. Opinion. 
65 Grover, “7 Ways 5G Will Help Advertising Evolve in 2019.” 
66 Husson, “Mobile’s Untapped Value Is in Contextual Data.” 
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ADTECH, ultimately, is enabled by the data end-users provide—often 
unknowingly—to the algorithms. Personal preferences, patterns of life, geolocation, and 
other metadata is utilized by ADTECH to synthesize personal profiles of each consumer. 
Generally, this data is anonymized, yet there are ample opportunities to still exploit users. 
The entire online advertising ecosystem connects consumers to advertisers and publishers 
via ad platforms and data aggregators. The aggregators are systems that collect enormous 
amounts of user data with “the specific aim of profiling their interests.”67 Through a variety 
of tools to include first and third party tracking, cookies, cookie matching technology, and 
device fingerprinting, these aggregators have designed data mining techniques that may 
even overcome moderate data protection best practices. 
First-Party Tracking. In this form of online tracking, the websites (i.e., ad 
publishers) allow data aggregation of the end-users. The consumer data is collected 
through HTTP cookies (a packet of information logging historical web traffic) and 
cookie monitoring as well as cataloguing information directly entered by the user.68 
Generally, first-party tracking is unique to a specific domain.  
 
Third-Party Tracking. Similar to first-party tracking, these tools use indirect 
means to monitor and gather internet user information via an intermediary not 
specifically tied to a domain.69 This activity usually occurs unbeknownst to 
individuals utilizing the internet and can lead to “massive aggregation of personal 
information.”70  
 
Cookie-Matching Technology. Cookie matching enables aggregators to share 
cookies or a collection of cookies with numerous advertisers or demand-side 
platforms. The effect of this technology allows advertisers a more holistic look at 
 
67 José Estrada-Jiménez et al., “Online Advertising: Analysis of Privacy Threats and Protection 
Approaches,” Computer Communications 100 (March 1, 2017): 35, 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.comcom.2016.12.016. 
68 “What Are Cookies?,” Norton, 2020, https://us.norton.com/internetsecurity-how-to-what-are-
cookies.html; Estrada-Jiménez et al., “Online Advertising,” 38. 
69 Estrada-Jiménez et al., “Online Advertising,” 38. 
70 Estrada-Jiménez et al., 38. 
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an end-user’s previous online habits and the ability to filter out consumers who do 
not match a predetermined profile.71   
 
Device Fingerprinting. In lieu of cookies, a technique called fingerprinting has 
emerged to maintain access to users who regularly ‘clean’ their computers. Each 
device has a unique ‘fingerprint’ or signature built on a string of data resulting from 
the operating system, version, and application configuration of that device.72 More 
concerning is that when this information is paired with a user’s IP address, it often 
can deliver a level of detail equal to cookies or enable the ‘regeneration’ of a deleted 
cookie, thus circumventing sanitation of cookie signatures.73  
The management of this data is a growing threat to personnel. Aggregation of 
personal data is generally done by benign actors—marketing firms looking to target 
consumers—however, more adversarial and malicious actors may utilize it for criminal, 
military, or intelligence purposes.74 It should be noted that it is not always clear which 
entities own, maintain, control or have access to this aggregated data. Due to the data 
marketplace, the information quickly and frequently changes hands, complicating 
measures to protect it.75 Even when steps are taken to properly secure information, 
nefarious actors utilizing illicit means often compromise data protections, leaving 
thousands vulnerable. More dangerous to military end-users operating within networks 
controlled by authoritarian regimes, this data resides on high-risk networks and is readily 
available to and often controlled by the state.  
 
71 Estrada-Jiménez et al., 38. 
72 Estrada-Jiménez et al., 38. 
73 Mikhail J. Atallah and Nicholas J. Hopper, “Erratum to: Privacy Enhancing Technologies,” in 
Privacy Enhancing Technologies, ed. Mikhail J. Atallah and Nicholas J. Hopper, vol. 6205 (Berlin, 
Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2017), 3, http://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-3-642-14527-8_17. 
74 T. X. Hammes, “Technology Converges; Non-State Actors Benefit,” Governance in an Emerging 
New World, Winter, no. 319 (February 25, 2019), https://www.hoover.org/research/technology-converges-
non-state-actors-benefit; Feldstein, “The Global Expansion of AI Surveillance,” 11. 
75 Terry Gross and Dave Davies, “How Tech Companies Track Your Every Move and Put Your Data 




The technological advancements of 5G will bring a monumental shift to the way 
the world telecommunicates. Fundamental changes to end-user devices, antenna and cell 
construction, network architecture, and urban and rural infrastructure will be required. 
However, in many ways, the more interesting question is what fundamental changes will 
be made to the capabilities enabled by emerging technology and how those resources will 
be operationalized. Enhanced mobile broadband, massive connectivity, and ultra-reliable 
low latency characteristics will do more than simply reduce the time it takes to download 
a file or improve the quality of streaming content. These capabilities, when packaged 
properly, can enable massive changes to way we go about our day to day lives. 
A smart city, one that is connected and synchronized, can streamline traffic and 
reduce pollution via the IoT. Consumers can interact with their environment via augmented 
reality, personalized by contextual marketing. Law enforcement and security professionals 
can monitor, assess, and anticipate criminal and terrorist activity through an integrated 
CCTV network paired with facial recognition and artificial intelligence. Accomplished at 
near real-time, each of these applications will depend on the proliferation of reliable and 
capable 5G networks. 
However, as SOF operations remain prolific within contested regions and often 
where adversarial 5G networks are proliferated, it will be important to understand the 
vulnerabilities of operating within these “high-risk” networks. Particularly as the 
distinctions between commercial, dual-use, and purpose-built equipment are reduced, 
security and signature management risks will challenge operational units to find creative 
solutions. Armed with a baseline of the emerging technological framework, exploring our 
adversaries’ strategic intentions—particularly China’s rise as a regional hegemon through 
the Belt and Road Initiative—as well as the implementation of 5G networks worldwide 
will inform an assessment of current and future threats to operations. 
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III. CHINA AND 5G 
If someone exists, there will be traces, and if there are connections, there 
will be information.76 
— China Electronics Technology Corporation Surveillance System Slogan 
China’s 5G proliferation strategy—a key feature of their Digital Silk Road nested 
within the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)—can be viewed through the lens of economic 
nationalism.77 From this perspective, recognizing that economic activity is subordinated 
to the goals and interests of the state fosters a better understanding of their actions and 
intent.78 The foremost objective of any economic nationalist regime is state-driven 
development coupled with approaching international economic relations as a zero-sum 
game.79 In today’s digital environment, China’s modernization of the information and 
communications technology sectors both at home and abroad creates an environment 
primed for their rise as an economic powerhouse. As Gilpin argues, when a rising power 
has a traditional economic nationalist viewpoint, that nation tends to wage economic 
warfare to satisfy national objectives; China’s own admissions and actions demonstrate 
their intentions to continue their international gains through economic means.80  
Looking at Japan’s rise from the ashes of World War II to economic prominence in 
the 1980s, we can gather a clear blueprint for economic nationalist activity and growth 
 
76 Chris Buckley and Paul Mozur, “How China Uses High-Tech Surveillance to Subdue Minorities,” 
The New York Times, May 22, 2019, sec. World, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/22/world/asia/china-
surveillance-xinjiang.html. 
77 Lars Magnusson, Mercantilism: The Shaping of an Economic Language (New York: Routledge, 
1994). 
78 Robert Gilpin, “Three Ideologies of Political Economy,” in The Political Economy of International 
Relations. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1987), 31–33. 
79 Theodore H. Moran, “An Economic Agenda for Neorealists,” International Security 18 (2) (Fall 
1993): 211–15. 
80 Robert. Gilpin and Jean Gilpin, Global Political Economy: Understanding the International 
Economic Order, Global Political Economy: Understanding the International Economic Order (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2001); “China: OBOR Will Follow Opportunities, Not Blueprint,” Oxford 




which is evident in China today. During the post-war period in Japan, the government 
recovery strategy favored economic growth and prosperity over personal and individual 
well-being; large companies were protected and subsidized by the state; and a highly 
educated workforce was the key to consistent growth and economic success.81 Following 
their neighbor’s example, the Chinese Communist Party has set out a well-defined strategy 
involving technological development and investment.82 Supported through heavily 
subsidized tech giants such as Huawei and benefiting from a skilled workforce that grew 
up in the cutthroat tech sectors of Beijing and Shenzhen, the result is a rising power that is 
utilizing the information and communications technology sector to solidify and catalyze 
their path to economic hegemony.83  
To assess the implications more accurately to special operations within a 5G 
environment, it is important to understand the telecommunications strategy of China, 
particularly with respect to the manufacturing and end-to-end hardware and software 
services offered by non-domestic providers. Aligning with their Digital Silk Road  
strategy, China is now the world’s greatest supplier of 5G technology.84 Using their 
telecommunications giant Huawei, China has rapidly proliferated their 5G technology—
both in infrastructure and software—to vast areas around the world through their Belt and 
Road Initiative.85 Established in more nations than any other competitor in the world, 
Huawei’s networks—often packaged as complete end-to-end services to include the 
hardware and software backbone as well as network controls—make up a significant swath 
 
81 Robert J. Crawford, “Reinterpreting the Japanese Economic Miracle,” Harvard Business Review, 
January 1, 1998, https://hbr.org/1998/01/reinterpreting-the-japanese-economic-miracle; Daniel Okimoto, 
Between MITI and the Market: Japanese Industrial Policy for High Technology (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1990). 
82 “China: OBOR Will Follow Opportunities, Not Blueprint.” 
83 Kai-Fu Lee, AI Superpowers: China, Silicon Valley, and the New World Order (Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin Harcourt, 2018), 15–16; “China: OBOR Will Follow Opportunities, Not Blueprint.” 
84 “My Way or the Huawei: 5G at the Center of US-China Strategic Competition,” July 23, 2019, 
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of the BRI’s Digital Silk Road.86 Geographically, the BRI overlaps with U.S. military 
operations in many regions. As a result, the United States and its allies need to accept the 
fact that many foreign telecommunication networks around the world must be regarded as 
“high-risk.”87 
A. THE STRATEGIC NATURE OF CHINA’S 5G EFFORTS—A DIGITAL 
SILK ROAD 
Guidance from the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has driven 
China to aggressively transform its economic foundation from industry and manufacturing 
to information and digital technology.88 In doing so, the government began heavily 
subsidizing Chinese technology firms during the 1990s and early 2000s, attempting to 
rapidly become the next world leader in digital and telecommunications technology.89 
China’s BRI strategy seeks to create a near continuous sphere of economic 
influence and support across the globe, cementing their rise as the next global superpower; 
in support of this long term initiative, China’s largest information, communication, and 
technology (ICT) companies are currently operating in nations along the BRI.90 Utilizing 
these companies, China is not only striving to expand their economic base by opening up 
digital marketplaces, but also seeking to own the information environment as well.  
Kai-Fu Lee warns that China is positioning itself in the modern digital age akin to 
Saudi Arabia’s position in the oil industry.91 In an industrial economy where oil was the 
foremost sought-after natural resource, nation-states lashed their economic futures and 
national defenses to oil reserves. In the digital information age, however, the internet-based 
 
86 Mishra. 
87 Medin and Louie, The 5G Ecosystem: Risks & Opportunities for DOD, 29. 
88 Lee, AI Superpowers: China, Silicon Valley, and the New World Order, 2–4. 
89 Lee, 2–4, 84, 98–100. 
90 “China: Digital Silk Road Will Boost China’s ICT Sector,” Oxford Analytica Daily Brief Service, 
January 22, 2018, http://search.proquest.com/docview/1989534760/. 
91 Lee, AI Superpowers: China, Silicon Valley, and the New World Order, 50, 55–56. 
 
28 
and inter-connected mobile economy will likely enable data to replace oil as the world’s 
most important economic resource.92  
China—the most populous nation on earth—maintains over 100 cities with 
populations over a million people and is sitting on the largest potential resource of data of 
any country.93 As a result of vast data resources and a “government-accelerated,” tech-
driven economy, Chinese companies such as Alibaba, Tencent, Baidu, and Huawei are less 
encumbered by market restrictions than their Western counterparts and have a marked 
advantage in developing software, tools, and technologies.94 Their substantial resources 
allied with the dizzying pace of their market economy allow Chinese firms to implement, 
test, and evaluate myriad technologies at rates faster than any other nation in the world.95 
During the rapid race to 5G, China has mirrored this approach in their BRI strategic 
trajectory, combining their immense domestic data resources and rapid technological 
fielding with international influence.96 As history has shown in previous rollouts of 3G 
and 4G/LTE—Europe and the United States enjoyed the first-mover advantage during 
these technological advancements, respectively—to the winner goes the economic 
spoils.97 China is currently winning the 5G race, with Huawei as their foremost 
thoroughbred.  
B. HUAWEI—CHINA’S LEADER IN 5G 
Huawei, China’s premier ICT company, is the largest telecommunications 
manufacturer and provider in the world.98 Headquartered in Shenzhen, China, it has 
established operations in more than 170 countries and employs over 188,000 personnel. 
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Huawei’s strength comes from their size and their ability to offer end-to-end 
telecommunications services to most any region throughout the world.99  
Much of Huawei’s current might is the result of the CCP’s support; since 1987, 
following their rise from a telephone switch company to a global telecommunications 
powerhouse, the firm has received more than $75 billion dollars in subsidies from the 
CCP.100 These subsidies have manifested in deals on land to build infrastructure, tax 
breaks nearing $25 billion dollars, and significant financial grants. Between 2013 and 2018, 
Chinese government grants to Huawei were 17 times larger than Finnish grants to Nokia 
while Swedish competitor, Ericsson, did not receive any government grants.101 
Given the level of governmental financial support offered to Huawei, it is hard to 
argue that Huawei does not have significant ties to the government. These connections to 
the CCP go beyond simply boosting economic strength, however; Chinese law and policy 
necessitates the cooperation of Chinese telecommunication firms—state-sponsored or 
not—to participate in intelligence gathering activities.102 The combination of government 
patronage with legal obligations to participate in domestic surveillance and the theft of 
international intellectual property has led to the U.S. government’s sweeping ban against 
Huawei, as well as significant political pressure abroad to institute similar restrictions.103  
Despite the U.S. government’s attempts to quell Huawei’s influence around the 
world, the telecommunications giant remains the chief competitor of other powerhouses 
such as Samsung, Ericsson, and Nokia; particularly as Huawei expands 5G technology 
throughout the developing world and along the digital silk road, Huawei’s key 
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characteristics keep them as a force to be reckoned with.104 One of the main strengths 
Huawei enjoys is the experience, expertise and capabilities of their people. Kai-Fu Lee 
notes that those working at Huawei are often tech-savvy entrepreneurs who grew up in the 
cutthroat Chinese technology market of the 2000s and 2010s.105 He argues that, as a result 
of the Chinese hyper-competitive technology sector, China’s workforce is forced to adapt, 
come up with innovative ideas, and wage economic war on each other’s companies. As a 
result, Huawei’s personnel understand the merciless business better than those brought up 
protected by Western policies enjoyed in Silicon Valley. Bolstered by the most capable 
engineers, innovators and technical experts in the field, Huawei’s aggressive navigation of 
this emerging field allowed them to enjoy a first-mover advantage in many regions years 
before many other competitors began to even familiarize themselves with 5G.106 
C. CHINESE 5G PROLIFERATION  
By far, one of their strongest attributes is Huawei’s ability to offer end-to-end 
telecommunications services that are inexpensive. With substantial government financial 
support, Huawei is able to offer products and services 30% cheaper than their competitors 
and often without political and diplomatic strings attached.107 When leveraged in 
developing areas, often along the BRI, Huawei’s model may be difficult or near impossible 
for these actors to turn down as they strive to keep up with modern development and 
globalization. As previously discussed, many of these nations are in regions of interest to 
special operations forces. And despite the ability of U.S. military operations to provide 
stand-alone communications, it is not uncommon for these forces to rely, at least partially, 
upon indigenous communications networks. 
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Already operating in 170 countries, Huawei’s products and services are highly rated 
and sought after in many regions.108 Combined with a price point well below what many 
competitors can offer, it is no surprise Huawei is winning the race to 5G. Showing a distinct 
capability to market in, deploy to, and invest in foreign markets like no other 
telecommunications company, they continue to aggressively test, evaluate and market their 
5G telecommunications systems around the world and have won a multitude of long term 
contracts.109 
1. Huawei’s Worldwide Investments 
In the face of the federal U.S. ban on utilizing Huawei equipment within domestic 
and government networks, as well as diplomatic pressure on allies to institute similar 
polices, the Chinese firm is still outperforming international competitors. Even the United 
States’ closest ally and member of the Five-Eyes intelligence sharing agreement, the United 
Kingdom, has been reluctant to ban Huawei from its telecommunications system.110 By 
early 2020, Huawei has secured over fifty 5G contracts in multiple countries throughout 
Asia and the Middle East as well as emerging contracts in Europe and South America.111  
As shown in Figure 6, existing Huawei infrastructure in large swaths of Africa, the 
Middle East and South America will likely allow further Chinese investment; Huawei’s 
attractive price points combined with infrastructure investments and a high level of 
political commitment from Beijing are critical factors allowing for Chinese technological 
proliferation.112 Additionally, Huawei’s accelerating expansion throughout Europe is also 
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a clear indicator of the tech giant’s influence in regions not typically vulnerable to 
economic manipulation.113 Gaining a significant foothold in Europe, Huawei announced 
plans in 2019 to build two research centers in Switzerland, as well as pledging $3.1 billion 
dollars to Italy’s network infrastructure.114 Worldwide, Huawei has recently claimed that 
nearly two-thirds of 5G networks outside of China utilize, at least partially, Huawei 
equipment.115  
 
Figure 6. Huawei’s Worldwide 5G Footprint116 
As previously discussed, this level of Chinese investment in international 
infrastructure is not unprecedented. Along the BRI, China’s digital silk road has expanded 
coverage to traditionally underserved populations and has upgraded the infrastructure 
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within existing telecommunication architectures at extremely competitive prices.117 Often, 
the end-to-end services are offered with perks that seem too good to be true—particularly 
to authoritarian states keen on taking advantage of so-called surveillance packages—yet, 
the unforeseen costs in terms of influence, control, security, debt traps, and limited 
domestic work opportunities may outweigh any benefit gained by partnering with 
Huawei.118 An example of such a case is China’s infrastructure investments within 
Cambodia—the Unites States once enjoyed much stronger ties to the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member-state, however, Cambodia recently suspended 
joint military operations in favor of its relationship to China.119 Regionally strategic due 
to its proximity to other United States allies and the South China Sea, it may prove 
beneficial to look at this specific example in order to analyze the risk associated with such 
an environment and the impact of partnership with China and Huawei.  
2. Cambodia—A Chinese 5G Vignette  
Huawei’s investment in Cambodia provides a keen example of effective 
proliferation of Chinese technology, increasing control, influence, and information 
awareness for the CCP. Despite the United States’ efforts to maintain political influence in 
Cambodia—its proximity to mainland China and the South China Sea adds significantly to 
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its strategic value—ties between Phnom Penh and Beijing have grown over recent 
years.120 Cambodia’s market conditions are representative of how low-cost end-to-end 
telecommunications services paired with political and economic corruption produce an 
environment ripe for Huawei’s manipulation and proliferation.121 
China is now Cambodia’s largest foreign investor; in 2017 and 2018, China’s 
investments in Cambodia accounted for nearly 25% of the $2.9 billion of annual foreign 
direct investments, and exceeded the combined investments of the 10 member states of the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).122 High investment in the country’s 
telecommunication network—often backed by pro-Chinese policies—represents China’s 
particular interest in this industry. More recently, in April of 2019, Telecom Cambodia—
a state-run telecommunications company—signed an agreement with Huawei to roll out 
5G nationwide in 2020.123 
Denying significant political and diplomatic influences within the country, 
Cambodian telecommunications executives frame the decision to partner with and utilize 
Huawei’s end-to-end services as a decision driven purely by economic competition.124 In 
order to manage their company’s success and their ability to compete with others, 
executives must look at technological compatibility, security and cost while overlooking 
the foreign influence that is often married to the deal. More often than not, in markets like 
Cambodia, executives prioritize cost over other factors in order to roll out technology, gain 
the first mover advantage, and defeat industry peers by offering new services to the local 
 
120 Phillip Orchard, “China’s Plan to Win Over Cambodia,” Real Clear, August 1, 2019, sec. World, 
https://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2019/08/01/chinas_plan_to_win_over_cambodia_113068.html. 
121 Andrew Nachemson and Kong Meta, “Cambodia’s Digital Surveillance Is Silencing Government 
Critics,” Post Magazine, October 19, 2019, https://www.scmp.com/magazines/post-magazine/long-
reads/article/3033508/cambodias-digital-surveillance-serves-silence. 
122 Wee Kee Hwee and Amelia Santos Paulino, “ASEAN Investment Report 2019” (Jakarta, 
Indonesia: ASEAN Secretariat and United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 2019), 9, 
https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/unctad_asean_air2019d1.pdf. 
123 Turton and Onishi, “Cambodia 5G Set to Leapfrog ASEAN Rivals with Huawei and ZTE.” 
124 Turton and Onishi. 
 
35 
population.125 As a result, Huawei’s appeal once again is the low-cost solution, thereby 
more frequently winning crucial telecommunications contracts to build the emerging 5G 
networks.  
Proliferation within Cambodia will be phased incrementally, initially focused on 
urban centers, targeting greatest population density and cost reduction. Cellcard, one of 
Cambodia’s largest telecommunications companies, plans to install five hundred small cell 
5G base stations in three of the country’s largest cities—Phnom Penh, Siem Reap and 
Sihanoukville—during its first phase of the rollout.126 Though these small cells are 
provided by ZTE—another state-controlled Chinese tech company that has been banned 
by the United States—Cellcard’s strategy also includes a great deal of support from Huawei 
equipment and expertise.127 This common pattern of early installation in densely populated 
urban areas will be a standard practice for worldwide 5G implementation. The cost of 
integrating adequate 5G architecture into legacy network infrastructure will initially reduce 
the sprawl of 5G technology into rural areas. The distinction between urban and rural 
networks—at least for the near term—may have significant impacts on SOF operations; 
since the telecommunication architectures will not be homogenous throughout a particular 
area of operations, it will be critical for mission analysis to understand the coverage, 
overlap, and gaps of each network type.  
Although the adoption of Huawei or ZTE based networks may draw short term 
economic gain for Cambodia and the large business entities within, there are significant 
costs and negative repercussions in other arenas. First and foremost, the control and 
influence that the Chinese Communist Party maintains of their domestic corporations is 
great.128 With Chinese 5G networks in place, China will own, perhaps de facto, the 
telecommunications infrastructure and, in turn, own the information environment. In an era 
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when information warfare rivals conventional means of power, this is of significant 
concern not only to the people of Cambodia but also to the United States and other Western 
countries.129 The addition of Chinese 5G networks in Cambodia also creates even greater 
economic dependence on the Eastern hegemon. When the reliance on China for the 
technology and expertise is combined with an alignment of the authoritarian Cambodian 
government with Beijing, there is significant cause for concern in the area of state-run 
technical surveillance as well.130 The costs of adopting Chinese 5G networks far outweigh 
their short-term benefits—the total impacts of which may not be seen for years to come. 
D. HIGH-RISK NETWORKS ARE THE NORM 
According to a Carnegie Endowment assessment, Huawei maintains a significant 
presence via infrastructure and artificial intelligence-based surveillance in many 
developing nations.131 Many of these regions overlap with areas the United States and its 
allies actively conduct activities to counter violent extremist organizations—namely the 
Middle East and Africa—as well as areas where great power competition has begun to 
reemerge—Eastern Europe and Asia. As we look at current proliferation efforts and trends, 
it is likely that Huawei—and more pointedly China—will own an even greater share of the 
global telecommunication networks, particularly in the 5G domain. Given the fact that an 
adversary and technological peer owns this infrastructure, it is imperative that we recognize 
the networks our forces are operating within are likely high-risk networks; it should be 
assumed that communications are monitored, activities surveilled, and physical and digital 
patterns of activity are acutely studied. Furthermore, it should be assumed that the more 
we rely on and operate within high-risk networks, the likelihood of cyberattack and cyber 
vulnerability increases. 
Expecting the convergence of 5G technology and artificial intelligence, special 
operations forces should anticipate vulnerabilities to manifest in ubiquitous technical 
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surveillance and weaponized advertising technology. Posing significant challenges to the 
conduct of special operations, these threats have the potential to remove the element of 
surprise and the plausible deniability so vital to maintaining operational security, force 
protection, and reducing overall risk to mission. 
1. Ubiquitous and State-Run Technical Surveillance Threat 
The adoption and implementation of 5G networks, characterized by an increased 
ability to network devices, expanded bandwidth, and reduced latency, will hyper-enable 
technical surveillance networks. The previously limited IoT will now be able to integrate 
more devices (cameras, microphones, biometric monitors, smart TVs, autonomous 
vehicles, etc.), collect and transmit information from those devices faster, and process the 
data using deep learning and artificial intelligence, creating near real-time situational 
awareness for an adversary. 
Not only does Huawei supply 5G equipment, but they and other Chinese firms, 
such as ZTE and Hikvision, also supply the AI-supported surveillance systems that will 
run on these networks.132 Shown in Figure 7, Huawei, by far, is the leading global supplier 
of advanced technical surveillance technology.133  
 




Figure 7. Leading Companies Contributing to AI Surveillance134 
China offers these surveillance systems as a complete package; from installation of 
the cameras all the way to building a surveillance command center, China’s “surveillance 
packages” are attractive to authoritarian governments looking for more robust social 
control as well as more liberal nations looking for law-enforcement and national security 
options. Table 1 offers insight into not only where AI-enabled surveillance has been 
proliferated, but also the nature in which the AI has been utilized.  
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 Focused Selection from the AI Global Surveillance Index135 
  
 
One of the more concerning capabilities that China exports, specifically through 
Huawei, is facial recognition. As part of its “safe city” platform exported to foreign 
markets, Huawei offers advanced facial recognition software and hardware; these packages 
generally include robust video surveillance as well as AI software support. Huawei built 
their first “safe city” in Nairobi, installing more than “1,800 cameras and 200 traffic 
 
135 Adapted from Feldstein, 25–28. 
 
40 
surveillance systems.”136 Likewise, in the French cities of Marseille and Valenciennes, 
ZTE and Huawei have partnered with local officials to implement “safe city” technology 
paired with big data AI networks; Valenciennes was gifted a full surveillance package that 
included high definition CCTV as well as an AI-driven command center to identify 
suspicious persons, crowds, or actions.137  
However, facial recognition is not the only concern with respect to newly integrated 
devices. As more devices join the network, the pairing of 5G and AI will be even stronger. 
AI depends upon more and more data points to create a more accurate, timely intelligence 
picture. Armed with that knowledge, government agencies, law enforcement, and even bad 
actors can target adversaries. The willingness and intent to engage in such activities has 
already been demonstrated around the world; in Uganda and Zambia, Huawei technology, 
as well as their employees, was utilized to spy on political opponents, “intercepting their 
encrypted communications and social media, and using cell data to track their 
whereabouts.”138 Achieved by utilizing the basic data available from legacy networks, 
these capabilities will continue to mature as 5G and AI are adopted into the mainstream. 
2. Advertising Technology-Based Threat 
The pairing of 5G and AI does not simply improve technical surveillance 
capabilities; as discussed in Chapter II, the power of advertising technology and its 
potential to become weaponized continues to grow. Particularly as social patterns of 
behavior continue to normalize the surrender of personal privacy, advertising technology 
remains a powerful tool for marketing, social control, and potentially in the future, military 
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action.139 The legacy 4G networks have already enabled markets around the world to 
capitalize on the marketing potential of contextualized, real-time or just-in-time 
advertising; however, we are just beginning to see the impacts these technology tools may 
have on social control and policing actions.140 The emergence of 5G technology paired 
with more advanced AI will accelerate their development and bolster the utility of these 
capabilities. 
China’s synthesis of online-to-offline applications (e.g., “real-world internet 
services” such as ride-sharing, meal delivery, or peer-to-peer financial transfers), AI 
analysis, and the proliferation of more integrated surveillance packages paired with data 
derived from advertising technology has become the standard-bearer for social and political 
control.141 Forms of data commonly used in advertising technology, as well as the 
advertising technology platforms themselves, are easily adapted to surveille individuals 
and predict their future behaviors. Throughout China today, these practices are already 
being utilized by intelligence collectors to develop profiles, track individuals, and 
anticipate decision-making, movement, and other actions.  
In regions all across China, “algorithmic governance” is being developed, 
implemented, and refined.142 Police in Kashgar enter suspicious behavior into mobile app 
databases; extended travel, refueling someone else’s vehicle, using an unusual amount of 
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electricity, or discontinuing use of a smartphone may all qualify as suspicious behavior.143 
Police are utilizing glasses enabled with facial recognition while the travel patterns, internet 
use, and social engagements of citizens are monitored.144 The nation’s two hundred 
million surveillance cameras—nearly four times the number of cameras in the United 
States—track faces, clothing, gait, and behavior.145 Analysis of this information is largely 
done by humans and occasionally augmented by automation; however, the Chinese police 
plan to spend nearly $30 billion to empower AI and “techno-enabled snooping” 
techniques.146  
China’s surveillance economy has grown beyond marketing and into social control; 
the commitment to monitoring their population has fueled immense research and 
development initiatives.147 State-media propaganda recently released a film touting the 
benefits of surveillance and the potential of predictive policing.148 China’s surveillance 
capabilities do not yet fulfill the dystopian vision of the film; however, as AI technology 
continues to advance and the volumes of data required to refine algorithms is delivered by 
a more connected 5G world, predictive policing may not be too far off. One main worry of 
political activists in the region is that once the capabilities of AI are fully realized, advanced 
“forensic safeguards may not be enough” to protect against government overreach  
and abuse.149  
E. CONCLUSION  
As advertising technology-based threats are refined and proliferated around the 
world, it is likely that social control will not be its only use; the veil of secrecy once enjoyed 
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by our special operations forces is at risk. High-risk, adversarial 5G networks are 
proliferating around the world and into many of the regions in which special operations 
missions are focused. When an adversary owns the telecommunications infrastructure, 
these operations are at risk of highly sophisticated surveillance utilizing artificial 
intelligence to analyze the abundance of data available (both anonymized and non-
anonymized). It is imperative we understand the implications of working in this realm and 
empower a shift in our methods, tradecraft, and the mindset of our men and women before 
stepping foot onto the battlefield. 
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IV. SIGNATURE MANAGEMENT IMPLICATIONS IN 5G 
For the first time in human history, it is near impossible to be 
unobserved.150 
—GEN Mark A. Milley 
Traditionally, successful special operations missions have relied on security, or 
secrecy, as well as their ability to capitalize on the element of surprise.151 These principles, 
among others, give special operations teams key advantages over an adversary that may 
otherwise enjoy relative superiority. A team that can effectively control the flow of 
information relative to their mission objectives, actions, and capabilities has a greater 
chance of achieving security and surprise. The adversary’s knowledge of this critical 
information is only gained by what they can observe—the physical and digital signature of 
an operation—and, therefore, the protection of this data is commonly referred to as 
signature management. However, as we have shown, the pervasiveness of surveillance and 
advertising technologies enhanced by 5G networks and artificial intelligence will challenge 
the ability to manage information to the same degree as special operations teams of the 
past. A brief exploration of signature, signature management, and deception (a tool that is 
sometimes employed to manage information) will help to clarify the implications of this 
emerging technological reality. 
A. SIGNATURE MANAGEMENT AND DECEPTION 
Drawing upon Dr. Kent Andersson and others, this thesis defines a signature as a 
set of unique and identifying characteristics, often in specific combination or aggregation, 
allowing for identification of a specific object, action, or phenomenon within an 
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46 
environment.152 In his thesis on signature management, Andersson highlights that 
signatures are observable characteristics of an entity by one or more sensors; signatures 
may present themselves in several forms, including electromagnetic waveforms, digital 
behavior, or visible characteristics.153 Signatures become actionable by an adversary when 
the information collected is paired with the context of the observation; risk to force and 
risk to mission are increased dramatically if this signature is not effectively managed, 
ultimately projecting unwanted information about the timing, nature, or location of an 
operation. 
Signature management—active and passive alterations to an entity’s contrast to its 
ambient environment—therefore, is a tool for military strategists, operational and tactical 
planners as well as the operators to maintain operational security (OPSEC) and retain the 
critical element of surprise.154 Altering a signature, ultimately, is a form of deception.  
J. Bowyer Bell concludes that “deception is the conscious, planned intrusion of an illusion 
seeking to alter a target’s perception of reality, replacing objective reality with perceived 
reality.”155 By this definition, we see that deception is a deliberate action or set of actions 
specifically intended to change the mindset and, in turn, the decisions of those we intend 
to deceive. 
Effective deception relies on and takes advantage of perceptual and cognitive 
biases; humans tend to perceive what is expected, and their own expectations tend to 
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condition what they perceive.156 Joint Publication 3-13.4, Military Deception further 
supports deception’s ability “to deliberately mislead [adversarial]…decision makers, 
thereby causing the adversary to take specific actions (or inactions) that will contribute to 
the accomplishment of the friendly mission.”157 If possible, the steadfast tool of deception 
would be of great assistance to operators and missions in future 5G environments. 
Traditionally, deception is relatively cheap in terms of manpower and resources to employ, 
and, when done effectively, can alter or confuse the situational awareness that an adversary 
may have gained. 
In defining his theory of deception, Bell notes two key modes of deception that 
obstruct the target’s ability to observe or to orient during the decision cycle: dissimulation 
and simulation.158 Bell explains that dissimulation is the act of hiding a characteristic or 
signature to mask the identity, location, intention, or action of an entity; this effectively 
inhibits the ability to observe. For example, a criminal enterprise may operate a commercial 
shipping vessel without utilizing the Automatic Identification System (AIS) transponder, 
effectively hiding its location due to the lack of radar and geolocation information.  
On the other hand, Bell expands, simulation is the act of showing a characteristic 
or signature to obfuscate the identity, location, intention, or action of an entity. An example 
of this would be a criminal element that operates a commercial shipping vessel while 
utilizing the AIS transponder signal of a different ship, effectively obfuscating its actions 
due to the altered signature; this effectively inhibits the ability to orient. It is important to 
note that dissimulation and simulation are always done in tandem; in other words, 
something will always be shown—even if it is a blank radar screen—while the true 
signature will be hidden. 
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To further highlight how a small special operations team projects a signature and 
the growing likelihood of surveillance of operations in a 5G environment, it may prove 
valuable to offer a short vignette. The vignette below will seek to paint a picture of the 
threats a special operations team may face while operating in high-risk 5G network 
environment.  
OPERATION GREEN WALL  
In this operation, a small team of special operators has been assigned 
to support missions within INDOPACOM in the small country of Hanu. 
Their objectives are: insert into an area, link up with indigenous forces, and 
establish relations for future irregular and asymmetric warfare training, and 
conduct reconnaissance on potential beach landing sites, helicopter landing 
zones, safe houses and other areas of interest to facilitate a potential 
insertion of a larger force.  
Though Hanu is of significant strategic importance to the United 
States and its allies, the Hanuan government also maintains close ties to 
China. Within the regional hegemon’s sphere of influence, like many other 
countries in this area, the Hanuan government has welcomed state-
controlled Huawei to establish the full suite of 5G telecommunications 
network and associated infrastructure throughout the country. To sweeten 
the deal, Huawei has thrown in a robust, centrally controlled surveillance 
system.  
The team, like many American special operations units, is racially 
homogenous, distinctively Western, and projects a physical signature that 
does not normally blend into the local communities of Hanu. They have 
received limited training in physical countersurveillance, have taken 
cybersecurity courses to manage their personal devices, and are rated as ‘fit 
to deploy’ by their home unit. Each member deployed with his personal 
computers and cell phones, though each will also utilize on local cell phones 
provided by the Special Operations Forces Liaison Element and Defense 
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Attaché at the United States Embassy for basic intra-team communication. 
The team’s 18E, or Communications Sergeant, has stressed the importance 
of not transmitting sensitive data or information via the local cell phones as 
the networks are likely monitored and assessed as high-risk. If needed, the 
team has access to secure communications at the U.S. Embassy.  
Upon arrival via commercial air into the main port of entry, the team 
makes their way to customs. Each team member, moments after stepping 
off the aircraft, is surveilled by the airport’s security camera system. Digital 
images of their faces are immediately imported into the robust security 
apparatus maintained by state intelligence agencies and integrated into the 
airport’s comprehensive technical surveillance system. Facial recognition 
software, enabled by artificial intelligence, identifies all six team members 
as foreign nationals who had not yet visited Hanu and establishes a profile 
for each of them. 
Their identities are confirmed, and their profiles cross-referenced 
and updated as the team processes through passport control. In addition, the 
team is required to provide fingerprints prior to clearing customs, allowing 
for a more complete profile of each person. This profile continues to build 
at the rental car desk as each driver’s license and vehicle information is 
added to the centralized security database. As the team continues to travel 
together and interact, their profiles are linked by the AI algorithms of the 
surveillance system; the actions of one now influence the assessment of the 
others as well. 
Upon arrival to the hotel, the team members begin using their 
personal devices via a 5G cell network connection. The IMEIs from their 
phones, the MAC addresses from their computers, as well as their individual 
device fingerprints allow the owner of the 5G network to develop specific 
digital profiles of each member of the team. Using geolocation, network 
architecture, and the hotel’s record of each teammate’s room location, each 
personal device and, therefore, its digital information is matched to the 
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individual’s security profile. In minimal time, utilizing 5G interconnectivity 
and artificial intelligence to parse out key data, the host nation has a 
strikingly transparent view of the team.  
Over the course of the next several days, the team conducts business 
as usual in the local community. They maintain a low physical profile while 
conducting meetings with the indigenous force they are assigned to train. 
They stroll leisurely on the beach while actually surveying a beach landing 
site. They go on runs across potential helicopter landing sites while 
becoming acquainted with the local area. At the conclusion of their work, 
the team enters the U.S. Embassy to submit their report via secure means to 
their superiors.  
Unbeknownst to the team, each one of their activities was surveilled 
in incredible detail, enabled by the 5G network. Local traffic cameras 
augmented with facial recognition software identified the team on their way 
to rendezvous with the local forces. When the government security team 
cross-referenced this hit with cell phone metadata from local small, pico- 
and femto-cells distributed throughout the region, each team member’s 
indigenous cell number was matched to their biometrics. Utilizing 
additional metadata—to include outgoing and incoming calls and text 
messages to key leaders of the indigenous force as well as the geolocation 
from each exploited device, the host nation was able to observe and develop 
a pattern of life on each team members’ movements, continue to build 
intelligence profiles, and determine key areas of the team’s focus. As a 
result, though not fully understanding the exact intent of the team’s actions, 
the Hanuan intelligence service was able to determine that numerous open 
grassy areas, three particular beach locations, and two private residences 
were of significant importance to the team’s mission.  
Upon completion of their mission, the team checked out of the hotel, 
paid with their government credit cards with accounts linking each of them 
directly to the U.S. military. Believing they had successfully and 
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clandestinely completed their mission, the team proceeded to the airport. 
Arriving at the customs processing counter, the team’s identities were once 
again confirmed by the integrated security system. However, this time, a 
security alert was triggered, and the team was detained. Faced with the 
aggregated meta- and surveillance data collected throughout the week, the 
team spent the next forty-eight hours with agents from the Hanu State 
Intelligence Division defending their actions. 
Due to increased reliance on technology by special operations coupled with a 5G 
environment that can exploit this reliance, the modern operator is burdened by increased 
cyber and signature vulnerabilities. This vignette highlights the dangers of operating in a 
5G adversarial environment without proper protective measures; military operations, daily 
pattern of life, and individual behaviors and associations can be developed at 
unprecedented speeds and with fidelity not yet seen. If weaponized, the data collected by 
the enemy may be able to predict a special operations team’s movements, actions, and 
objectives—a significant problem for operational security and a risk to both the team and 
mission. Moreover, the level of surveillance and situational awareness of the team’s 
activities could remove any plausible deniability, risking the safety of the team as well as 
incurring negative strategic impacts for U.S. interests. Whereas in previous conflicts 
special operations teams were able to manage their signatures more easily, a high-risk 5G 
network combined with advanced analysis tools presents unique and significant challenges 
in this realm.  
B. SIGNATURE MANAGEMENT THREAT NEXUS 
The factors illustrated in the Hanu vignette are each elements and components of 
the threat ecosystem. We addressed each of these elements in previous chapters; however, 
a look at the overlap of each threat element highlights some relationships worth exploring. 
Figure 8 portrays the four main elements of an adversarial data analysis framework 




Figure 8. Signature Management Threat Nexus 
The characteristics as well as the employment of the first two elements of the threat 
nexus, addressed in chapters II and III, are Network Infrastructure and User Data. Network 
Infrastructure includes the hardware and software architecture that is owned, operated, 
controlled, and accessed by a range of public, private, and state actors. The infrastructure 
connects end-users to data and vice-versa; this encompasses everything from the cellular 
architecture, personal devices, and the networked sensors that enable a smart city, to the 
virtual cellular network controls, and the software that enables device applications. User 
Data, on the other hand, includes the broad range of data unique to an individual: metadata, 
biometrics, facial recognition, traffic camera footage, passport control data, personal 
communications, shopping preferences, geolocation, etc. Accumulated information within 
a single device is simply a data set; however, the overlap of data transmitted and received 
within a network results in telecommunications. While singularly not a threat, 
telecommunication is a central component of the threat nexus. 
The two remaining elements of the Signature Management Threat Nexus are 
Network Surveillance and Artificial Intelligence. Network Surveillance is the level of 
situational awareness the adversary maintains of the individual users as well as the content 
of their data and network activity. As discussed previously, it is suspected that China 
maintains a high level of control within their domestic networks and their reach has often 
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extended to the networks proliferated internationally by companies such as Huawei. We 
assess that non-anonymized user data as well as network information will be widely 
accessible to the Chinese government and other friendly and adversarial intelligence 
organizations. Artificial Intelligence is a useful surveillance analysis tool for state 
intelligence organizations. With the ability to distill massive amounts of data very quickly 
and to identify connections likely not observed by humans, AI is critical to the future of 
military and state intelligence. The combination of these two elements forms another 
central component of the threat nexus: Non-Anonymized Data Analysis Capability. 
There are two other intersections of the main elements that combine in important 
ways. Advertising Technology is enabled by the combination of Artificial Intelligence and 
User Data; it is a common marketing analysis tool for commercial use in the exploitation 
of anonymized consumer data. Highlighted in chapters II and III, as the volume of data 
swells with the emergence of 5G technology, equally advanced artificial intelligence 
capabilities are growing to support the distillation of these data sets. Though generally used 
for commercial purposes, states can similarly apply analysis of non-anonymized data to 
meet national security objectives; the analysis of individual and group behaviors, 
preferences, and locations may provide an understanding of past and present behaviors 
while simultaneously providing the adversary with the tools to potentially predict future 
outcomes. 
Finally, the last intersection—Network Infrastructure combined with Network 
Surveillance—results in a High-Risk Network. As discussed in Chapter III, these networks 
are subject to state-controlled surveillance and serve as a source of exploitable non-
anonymized data. While Huawei sourced networks are an example of Chinese-controlled 
and surveilled high-risk networks, it should be assumed that this practice could be utilized 
by other state actors as well. Without sufficient countermeasures, users on this network 
should assume vulnerabilities to surveillance and privacy exist. 
The convergence of these essential elements and components is the Signature 
Management Threat Nexus. Adversarial ability to access non-anonymized user data 
coupled with the capability to employ sophisticated AI algorithms may provide the ability 
to compromise the operational security of a mission. Not only could adversaries potentially 
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identify and monitor a specific team, but through weaponized advertising technology 
algorithms, it may also be possible for an adversary to predict the future behaviors, 
locations, or actions of a team.  
C. SIGNATURE MANAGEMENT IMPLICATIONS OF 5G NETWORKS 
The Signature Management Threat Nexus Model demonstrates how 5G 
telecommunications technology and its global proliferation will have numerous and 
significant impacts to small unit team operations throughout the world; however, managing 
signature within this environment may prove to be one of the most important challenges to 
overcome. Based on our research, we have prioritized three main implications that risk 
signature management in future operations: 
 5G Implications for Signature Management 
1.   High-risk 5G telecommunications networks will be the norm 
2.   5G enables proliferation of unprecedented, ubiquitous technical surveillance 
capabilities 
3.   AI-driven intelligence analysis of surveilled and high-risk networks threatens 
signature management at a greater rate and with greater fidelity than pre-5G 
capabilities 
 
High-risk 5G telecommunication networks will be the norm. Chinese and other 
adversarial high-risk 5G networks are prevalent throughout the world, particularly in 
regions where special operations forces operate. These high-risk networks—defined by the 
ability of a state or non-state actor to access non-anonymized user data—allow our 
adversaries a distinct advantage in the information warfare space, increasing the chance of 
non-anonymized surveillance of our teams’ activities.  
5G enables proliferation of unprecedented, ubiquitous technical surveillance 
capabilities. 5G networks provide a massive number of connections, unlocking the 
potential of the IoT. The IoT, often designed to connect consumer products or to integrate 
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community security infrastructures, can also actively and passively detect, process, and 
analyze data in near real-time. Regardless of the purpose, the IoT will establish novel and 
ubiquitous technical surveillance capabilities.  
As AI capabilities mature, the information aggregated on surveilled and high-risk 
networks becomes more vulnerable to exploitation. The vast amounts of data becoming 
available, readily synthesized by hyper-enabled artificial intelligence, requires special 
operations forces to operate with more nuance and refined capabilities. Signatures that were 
once sufficiently managed may become liabilities in the future. AI-driven intelligence 
analysis of surveilled and high-risk networks threatens signature management at a greater 
rate and with greater fidelity than pre-5G capabilities. 
The convergence of these implications presents novel challenges to our special 
operations forces. This new paradigm threatens to compromise operational security while 
complicating the ability of our forces to adequately manage signature through direct or 
deceptive means. However, we should not lose hope that signature management and age-
old deception tactics are obsolete. Instead, we should look for opportunity in the same 
digital environment that has produced these risks; it may be possible that deception can be 
executed with significantly less effort and more rapidly than ever before. 
The rapid growth of the information environment under the current 4G/LTE 
networks will only increase as the next generation 5G telecommunications technology is 
adopted. As a result, information warfare now rivals traditional conventional warfare.159 
Protecting and limiting the data available to the adversary will remain an important element 
of signature management. However, deception will also endure as an essential signature 
management tool as well. We are approaching an environment where instead of building 
an entire Ghost Army, an adept operator with a computer or simply a smart phone device 
may be able to execute sound deception. A keen operator at the edge, understanding both 
the environment and the perceptual and cognitive biases of his target, may be able to create 
ambiguity or doubt with remarkable efficiency. 
 
159 McFate, The New Rules of War: Victory in the Age of Durable Disorder, 8–9. 
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The emergence of 5G telecommunications technology promises to make 
fundamental changes in the way our world connects. Capabilities that were hypothetical 
until this point may soon be realized due to the increased bandwidth, capacity, and reduced 
latency of 5G architectures. While there are many reasons to welcome the benefits created 
by this new environment, the risks to our armed forces should be addressed thoughtfully 
and with caution. Particularly among our special operations forces, signature management 
is critical to military success; however, the proliferation of high-risk networks—many 
controlled by our adversaries—that unlock the capabilities of 5G connectivity and artificial 
intelligence will threaten special operations missions. Individual user data, data practices, 
physical signatures, and communications may simultaneously become aggregated, 
transmitted, analyzed, and actioned at unprecedented speeds. As was shown in Table 2 
(repeated here for convenience) our research, thus far, has shown three primary 
implications. 
Table 2. 5G Implications for Signature Management 
1.  High-risk 5G telecommunications networks will be the norm 
2.  5G enables proliferation of unprecedented, ubiquitous technical surveillance 
capabilities 
3.  AI-driven intelligence analysis of surveilled and high-risk networks threatens 
signature management at a greater rate and with greater fidelity than pre-5G 
capabilities 
 
Using the Threat Nexus Model and the implications that follow as a guide, there 
are several areas of interest to assist in the mitigation of each threat. Some items can be 
actioned immediately or prior to the widespread fielding of 5G technology while others 
will require a more long-term look, including research initiatives spread across various 
disciplines. The recommendations and research questions posed below are not 
comprehensive nor are they fully developed. The intention here is to provide opportunity 
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as well as inspiration for additional questions not posed by the authors. It is our hope that 
by identifying the elements and components that contribute to creating a signature 
management threat nexus, those charged with creating mitigation strategies may find a 
starting point to focus their efforts into one or more of these threat factors. 
A. RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Immediate Action Opportunities 
In the near-term, attention to end-user behaviors can protect the type and volume 
of user data present on the network. The critical process of protecting mission critical and 
personally identifiable information will remain a key tenet of managing signatures and 
protecting operational security, however, will become exponentially more difficult to 
execute. Because of this, continued cybersecurity, and personal data protection education 
of the force as well as integration of these elements into mission planning is essential. 
a. RECOMMENDATION: Reduce User Data 
Continue efforts to reduce the volume and sensitivity of data input onto public and 
private networks—this does not include government-sanctioned networks designed to 
support sensitive information, as there are proper security control mechanisms in place to 
protect the data. This recommendation extends to not only official government entities and 
associated activities but also to individual service members. Recognizing that our world is 
continuing to shift toward more and more data, individuals should still make mindful 
decisions relative to the type of personal data that is made accessible via the network, 
personal device applications, smart devices (i.e., fitness watches, networked home security 
devices, etc.), and other networked IoT hardware. 
b. RECOMMENDATION: Protect User Data and Counter Surveillance 
While many of the cybersecurity best practices are still vitally important during and 
after the transition to 5G technology, a recent Brookings Institution report highlighted that 
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data protection must adapt.160 One key takeaway from the Brookings report as well as a 
Defense Innovation Board 5G study is that perimeter defense is no longer adequate; a zero-
trust network approach will be required.161 To do this, it will be necessary to procure, 
develop, and field robust encryption applications as well as other user identification and 
authorization strategies.162 In the civilian sector, the industry continues to internally 
address how best to protect telecommunication network users from data compromise; 
however, the Brookings report suggests that much of the security burden remains with the 
user.163 As military applications and networks continue to become more integrated into 
dual-use networks, it is imperative that the military removes the security burden from the 
end-user and instead develops a security framework that will protect critical data regardless 
of an end-user’s technological sophistication. 
c. RECOMMENDATION: Force Education on Compromised Networks 
and Advertising Technology 
To prepare both our communicators as well as our operators to engage and operate 
in a high-risk network environment, training opportunities should be enhanced to address 
the security burdens they will bear. Topics should include but not be limited to: 
 Zero-trust Network Approach 
 Signature Management 
 Advertising Technology Threats 
 Encryption 
 Cloud-based Network Operations and Management 
 Mission Command/Decentralized Execution & Communication 
d. RECOMMENDATION: Mission Planning for High Risk Networks 
Mission planning tasks should include a comprehensive overview of the local 
telecommunications network. An assessment of the infrastructure, state control, likelihood 
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of surveillance, vulnerabilities to data compromise, and other relevant factors should be 
utilized. This will allow planners and operators to identify overall risk to operational 
security, suitable signature management tools, TTPs, as well as appropriate hardware and 
software requirements for mission completion. As nations begin to transition to 5G, a 
flexible response to the types of technology fielded and strategies employed will be 
necessary and may require regionally dependent approaches.  
2. Long-Term Opportunities 
In the long-term, there are several lines of research that are necessary to fully 
understand the emerging battlespace as well as to identify techniques or technologies 
that may mitigate the risk of operating within regions that are characterized by high-risk 
networks. Current efforts by the United States to define a 5G National Security Strategy 
attempt to address the “risks to United States…national security during development 
and deployment of 5G infrastructure worldwide;” the following focus areas touch on a 
range of research questions that, if answered, may help navigate some of the national 
security and signature management obstacles presented by adversarial 5G networks around 
the world.164 
a. RESEARCH: Network Infrastructure and High-Risk Networks 
Security Vulnerability Assessment of 3GPP 5G Standards 
The final international standards for 5G are still being finalized. Therefore, the 
United States has opportunity to influence the security protocols as well as other 
fundamental aspects of the 5G framework. In any case, a full security assessment of the 
5G standards will be necessary for all end-users to understand what risks and vulnerabilities 
remain. 
• Once finalized, what are the assessed security vulnerabilities of the 
established 3GPP Specification Set: 5G Standards? What are the standard 
security expectations? 
 
164 The White House, National Strategy to Secure 5G of the United States of America (Washington, 
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• What are the protocols to maintain physical and virtual security of the 
infrastructure? 
• How does the implementation of these standards vary worldwide? 
• How is cybersecurity best maintained to prevent bad actors from taking 
advantage of network virtualization controlled on publicly available 
operating systems utilizing common internet protocol language? 
• How are IoT devices authenticated? Encrypted? What are the best 
practices to avoid backdoor network access via an unsecure IoT device? 
• Through the procurement and controlled testing of an adversarial 5G 
network or discrete devices, what vulnerabilities and opportunities can be 
assessed? 
b. RESEARCH: Network Infrastructure 
Private Networks and Trusted Communication in High-Risk Networks 
Private networks will be a fundamental element of future 5G networks for many 
reasons; self-driving cars, medical records, automated factories, and military applications 
are just a few. In theory, these networks ensure a secure medium upon which information 
can be shared, stored, and processed. When coupled with edge computing and catalyzed 
by 5G’s low latency and increased bandwidth, these private networks may offer special 
operations teams a platform to operate away from the public architecture and hopefully, 
away from the scrutiny of a network operator. However, there are still several questions 
about the infrastructure required as well as the assurance of privacy that will need further 
evaluation. 
• Are tactical, private 5G networks viable? 
• What infrastructure, equipment, and manning are required to maintain 
tactical, private 5G networks? 
• What level of assurance can be maintained? 
• What level of trust or classification can be assured within a tactical, 
private 5G networks? 
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• Do tactical, private 5G networks assume additional signature management 
risks? 
• Are trusted communications viable within a high-risk network? 
• What level of trust or classification can be assured within a high-risk 
network? 
• What additional end-to-end encryption, channel hardening, or other 
mechanisms are required to assure trusted communications? 
• Do trusted or secure communications within a high-risk network assume 
additional signature management risks? 
c. RESEARCH: Telecommunications and Compromised Networks 
Edge Computing 
The distributed nature of 5G networks also enables edge computing. Without the 
need to reach back to a centralized mainframe, critical analysis tools can be employed by 
end-users at the edge. This technique may reduce the required data traffic—and therefore 
digital signature—for in-field analysis. It may also enable teams to employ signature 
management tools to inject falsities, distractions, or other deception in near real-time. 
• Does edge computing reduce the likelihood of data compromise? 
• What capabilities may be enhanced by edge computing? 
• Will edge computing reduce the likelihood of state-sponsored 
surveillance? 
• Does edge computing reduce the required footprint of a SOF team? 
• Can edge computing be utilized to inject falsities or a preferred signature 
into the network? 
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• What infrastructure, equipment, and manning are required to support edge 
computing? 
d. RESEARCH: Telecommunications and Compromised Networks 
Upskilling Via Virtual and Augmented Reality (VR/AR) 
An opportunity presented within a 5G environment is the ability to employ 
upskilling by a team in the field. Due to the ultra-low latency and enhanced bandwidth, 
virtual and augmented reality could now enable virtual or remote team members to join an 
operation. Should a specialized skill be required, rather than bringing an additional person 
along and increasing the footprint and signature of an operation, a specialist could remotely 
guide, monitor, instruct, or upskill a special operations team on anything from field 
medicine to language interpretation to intelligence collection. 
• Can SOF teams utilize VR/AR capabilities to employ upskilling and thus 
reduce the required footprint? 
• What infrastructure, equipment, and manning are required to support 
VR/AR upskilling? 
• What signature management benefits and risks are associated? 
e. RESEARCH: Artificial Intelligence and Non-Anonymized Data 
Analysis Capability 
Deception: Counter Non-Anonymized Data Analysis Capabilities 
Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) are supported by deep machine learning 
to actively deceive another AI network. Generally used to help AI networks learn, it is also 
possible to utilize a GAN to inject falsities to either disrupt analysis capabilities, flood an 
AI with false information, produce deep fakes, or simply obscure data. There may be 
opportunities to overcome several technical surveillance threats by utilizing a GAN for 
purposeful deception.  
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Other deception opportunities may include wearables to defeat biometric sensing 
or facial recognition. Additionally, physical alterations or camouflage may prove helpful 
in defeating early applications of AI-driven data analysis. 
• Can a Generative Adversarial Network (GAN) be utilized to counter the 
non-anonymized data analysis capability of an adversary? Can a GAN 
reliably inject falsities or a preferred signature into the network? 
• Can wearable IoT devices defeat biometric or facial recognition sensing? 
• Can physical alterations or camouflage be utilized to defeat video 
surveillance? 
There are likely many additional research opportunities not addressed above. As 
previously noted, the intent here is to simply inspire additional research questions and to 
provide a pathway to the relevant factors that contribute to signature management threats. 
B. CONCLUSION 
It is still too early to observe the full impact of 5G technology on societies, 
particularly how these capabilities will change the face of warfare. With a best attempt to 
anticipate a potential area of vulnerability, we have highlighted not only the technological 
change but also how these technologies can be weaponized. Militaries will have access to 
unprecedented volumes of data streaming in at near real-time for analysis. Sophisticated 
AI tools and behavioral analysis algorithms currently employed by commercial entities can 
rapidly and accurately distill that data into actionable intelligence. Current location, 
battlefield characterization, and predictive behavior assessment may soon easily be 
generated by the rapid analysis of seemingly unrelated, aggregated data. 
As 5G networks are proliferated around the world, special attention should be paid 
to which entities own, operate, and access the infrastructure as well as the data. 
Authoritarian regimes that enjoy unfettered access to non-anonymized user data and 
network information are likely to use this capability to control and influence their own 
people as well as maintain situational awareness of military and state intelligence interests. 
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SOF operations within regions assessed to have high-risk networks without some level of 
mitigation may be in danger of compromising their forces and their mission. Though the 
United States may have been caught on their heels in this respect, we should not be 
discouraged in our ability to overcome and to mitigate these risks. 
Now is a unique yet narrow window of opportunity to actively engage with the 
challenges and opportunities within this paradigm, to innovate solutions and drive the 
emerging design of an environment that is not yet determined, and to truly adapt to 
tomorrow’s fight rather than prepare to fight the last war better. Our adversaries have 
embraced this call-to-arms, yet there is time—though fleeting—to learn from, to adapt to, 
and to control this environment. It is therefore crucial that leaders develop strategies to 
protect the signature management of our teams; these strategies should address the risks in 
telecommunications, high-risk networks, advertising technology, and non-anonymized 
data analysis. The strategies should strive for defensive capabilities yet also seek 
opportunity for advantage. Effective implementation will require immediate action paired 
with intelligent feedback as well as long term investment in public and private research 
lines of effort. Ignoring any one of the essential elements and components that threaten 
signature management will leave our forces insufficiently protected and our national 
security at risk. 
  
66 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
 
67 
APPENDIX.  A SURVEY OF 5G TECHNOLOGY ADVANCEMENTS 
The allocation of new radio wavelength bands, alterations to the cellular base 
station architecture and network control, as well as the design of smart and directional 
antennae are only a few of the technical challenges 5G innovators will face. While the 
following sections do not provide an exhaustive survey of the emerging 5G technology, 
the key adaptations that will affect SOF operations or have signature management 
implications are addressed. 
A. WAVEFORMS: A DEBATE OVER LOW, MEDIUM, AND HIGH BANDS  
The debate over which frequency bands will dominate 5G is still open, however, it 
is likely that the network will depend upon frequencies in the low, medium, and high bands. 
Aside from meeting the consumer and industry demands for faster, more capable cellular 
networks, 5G technology promises to meet another growing challenge—bandwidth. 
Currently, wireless technology operates primarily in low frequency bands—generally 
between 3kHz and 3GHz.165 These frequency bands—shown in Figures 9 and 10—
traditionally offered reliable propagation characteristics and had plenty of data carrying 
capacity.166 Over time, however, these bands have become congested and continue to host 
3G and 4G cellular networks, Wi-Fi, WiMAX, L-band, C-band and S-band satellite 
communication, GPS, as well as several other RF-based technologies.167  
 
165 Agiwal, Roy, and Saxena, “Next Generation 5G Wireless Networks: A Comprehensive Survey,” 
1618. 
166 Agiwal, Roy, and Saxena, 1618. 
167 Sunny Classroom, “5G Cellular Networks”; Gupta and Jha, “A Survey of 5G Network,” 1207. 
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Figure 9. Commercially Exploited Bands of the Radio-Frequency Spectrum168 
 
Figure 10. Proposed 5G Radio-Frequency Band169 
As more wireless technology is added to the network, the already overcrowded 
frequency bands risk reducing overall capability and quality of experience. In response, 
scientists and industry leaders are exploring other frequency bands in addition to 
techniques for more efficient use of current bands. Low, medium, and high bands are under 
examination and each offer distinct opportunities as well as drawbacks (Figure 2, reprinted 
 
168 Source: “Radio-Frequency Spectrum.” 
169 Source: Sunny Classroom, “5G Cellular Networks.” 
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here for convenience, illustrates these characteristics).170 In fact, companies such as 
Huawei, Verizon, and Ericsson have already begun the acquisition and development of 
these bands.171 It is important to note, that while each band has some unique 
characteristics, the high frequency bands currently under development are of interest 
mainly due to the available space to expand; had the high bands been used for the original 
telecommunications generations, we would now be expanding into the low bands.172  
 
Figure 2. Multi-layer Frequency Overlay on 5G Use-Cases173 
Low Bands. At the low end of the RF bands, frequencies less than 2 GHz show 
promise for wide-area coverage and deep indoor coverage for a range of capabilities. 
Although the data rates are significantly lower than medium and high frequencies due to 
 
170 “Public Policy Position: 5G Spectrum,” 6; Medin and Louie, The 5G Ecosystem: Risks & 
Opportunities for DOD, 12. 
171 “Public Policy Position: 5G Spectrum,” 10–12; Medin and Louie, The 5G Ecosystem: Risks & 
Opportunities for DOD, 12. 
172 Sue Marek, “Low-Band, Mid-Band or High-Band—Why Spectrum Bands Matter in a 5G World,” 
Futurithmic, February 11, 2020, https://www.futurithmic.com/2020/02/11/why-spectrum-bands-matter-in-
a-5g-world/. For a more detailed discussion relative to waveform characteristics, see the Appendix. 
173Adapted from “Public Policy Position: 5G Spectrum,” 6; Cradlepoint 5G Strategy Group, The 5G 
for Business Guidebook: A Guide to Understanding and Exploring the Pathway to 5G, 7–8. 
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the congested bands, less demanding applications such as passive sensors, IoT integration, 
and even some massive machine type communications (mMTC) and ultra-reliable latency 
communications (URLLC) capabilities may benefit from the extended range and reduction 
of environmental interference within the low band. Much of the infrastructure, hardware, 
and devices currently deployed worldwide already support these frequency bands and these 
bands extend the range of certain 5G capabilities; however, limitations in data capacity and 
frequency crowding restrict the effectiveness of these bands.174 As such, the use of this 
band will likely be restrained in the future.  
High Bands. On the other side of the spectrum, high frequency bands are generally 
less crowded, allowing for scientists to explore the mmWave bands, generally between 3–
300 GHz.175 These frequencies—named so because the physical wavelength of these 
frequencies are measured in millimeters vice the traditional wireless frequencies that are 
measured in meters or kilometers—promise extremely high data rates.176 The high bands 
identified for 5G (24-100GHz) are largely untapped, supporting wide bandwidth 
availability enabling very high data rates.177 
These frequencies, however, suffer from drawbacks in undesirable propagation 
characteristics and increased environmental interference. This disadvantage drives 
mmWave to exist as a largely line-of-sight capability, somewhat relieved by some clever 
engineering and smart antenna technology. Though mmWave does not have the range and 
penetration capabilities of low frequency bands, the waveform requires a much smaller 
antenna, allowing a single cell station to support 10–100 times more antennae.178 As a 
result, a much denser antenna architecture is utilized, integrating multiple sizes of cellular 
 
174 “Public Policy Position: 5G Spectrum,” 6; Medin and Louie, The 5G Ecosystem: Risks & 
Opportunities for DOD, 10. 
175 Agiwal, Roy, and Saxena, “Next Generation 5G Wireless Networks: A Comprehensive Survey,” 
1618. 
176 Cradlepoint 5G Strategy Group, The 5G for Business Guidebook: A Guide to Understanding and 
Exploring the Pathway to 5G, 7. 
177 Sunny Classroom, “5G Cellular Networks.” 
178 Erik G. Larsson et al., “Massive MIMO for next Generation Wireless Systems,” IEEE 
Communications Magazine 52, no. 2 (February 2014): 187, https://doi.org/10.1109/MCOM.2014.6736761. 
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access nodes and is comprised of thousands of nested small-, micro-, pico- and femto-cells 
tightly distributed throughout a city. The density of the antennae should eliminate coverage 
gaps that manifest due to interference and undesirable propagation characteristics of the 
high band.179 There is still much to be discovered, designed, and implemented within the 
mmWave bands, however, if estimations hold, the true leaps in capability that 5G promises 
can only be realized with the integration of these higher bands. 
Medium Bands. The medium bands, often referred to as the sub-6 GHz bands, have 
shown early success not only overcoming several of the shortfalls of the low and high 
bands, but also share many of the advantages of each band. Although upgrades to devices 
and some infrastructure are still required for this band, the advantages and disadvantages 
in coverage, capacity, and latency seem to be more balanced within this band. One of the 
greatest advantages of the sub-6 5G bands is its ability to reasonably propagate and 
penetrate obstacles while also supporting a much greater capacity and very low latency as 
compared to current 4G/LTE networks.180 In fact, the majority of carriers throughout the 
world, including Huawei/ZTE, T-Mobile, and Ericsson, who are early implementors of 5G 
networks are operating or testing within this mid-band.181  
Demonstrated in Figure 11, a Signal Propagation Loss and Terrain (SPLAT) chart 
of potential 5G wavelengths, urban landscapes have a significant effect on mmWave (28 
GHz) and sub-6 GHz (3.4 GHz) frequencies.182 Users in blue would experience 100Mbps 
of speed compared to users in red achieving up to 1 Gbps.183 The sub-6 propagation travels 
over two and half times as far as the mmWave while accommodating similar data rates and 
speeds. Many experts believe that these advantages will cement sub-6 bands as the primary 
 
179 Sunny Classroom, “5G Cellular Networks”; “What Is 5G? Understanding the Next-Gen Wireless 
System Set to Enable Our Connected Future,” January 23, 2019, https://www.cbinsights.com/research/5g-
next-gen-wireless-system/; Agiwal, Saxena, and Roy, “Towards Connected Living: 5G Enabled Internet of 
Things (IoT),” 196. 
180 “What Is 5G?”; Gilbert, “Spectrum for 5G Will Ensure Investment in Africa.” 
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GHz Band”; “Built for the 5G Future.” 
182 Medin and Louie, The 5G Ecosystem: Risks & Opportunities for DOD, 9. 
183 Medin and Louie, 9. 
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frequencies for emerging networks.184 There are others, however, that believe sub-6 bands 
are simply a transitional band, enabling the leap to mmWave 5G following further research, 
testing and fielding.185 In either scenario, it seems that the architecture will comprise of 
some combination of each band. 
 
Figure 11. “SPLAT” Chart of mmWave Propagation (left) vs.  
Sub-6 Propagation (right)186 
Multi-band Approach. While each band has its own strengths and weaknesses, it is 
likely that each one will play an important role in enabling future 5G networks. While it is 
likely that the medium band will do the majority of the heavy lifting for now, there are 
functions that this bands would be incapable of executing—enhanced mobile broadband 
requiring extremely high data rates coupled with low latency—or would be inappropriate 
for—IoT systems that do not demand high data or latency characteristics. It is in these 
 
184 Medin and Louie, 10; “Public Policy Position: 5G Spectrum,” 5. 
185 “Key Breakthroughs to Drive a Fast and Smooth Transition to 5G Standalone,” August 2, 2019, 
https://www.qualcomm.com/news/onq/2019/08/19/key-breakthroughs-drive-fast-and-smooth-transition-5g-
standalone. 
186 Source: Medin and Louie, The 5G Ecosystem: Risks & Opportunities for DOD, 9. 
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instances that the high- or low-bands would be more appropriate. The trade-offs associated 
with each band are summarized below in a reprint of Figure 3; balancing capacity and 
latency with wide-area coverage and building penetration will require a blend of each band. 
And until the science, technology, and infrastructure catches up, it may be some time until 
the full benefits of mmWave are seen.187 
 
Figure 3. 5G Spectrum Trade-Offs188 
B. ARCHITECTURE: DENSE, USER-CENTRIC HYBRID AND 
STANDALONE NETWORKS 
The current radio access network (RAN) architecture is base station centric; 
systematically placed macro base stations, each responsible for a hexagonal footprint, are 
linked to mobile switching centers (MSC) that direct voice and data traffic within the 
network.189 This system works well within the currently utilized radio frequency (RF) due 
to efficient area coverage and frequency reuse as well as the propagation characteristics of 
 
187 personal communication, February 18, 2020. 
188 Source: Gilbert, “Spectrum for 5G Will Ensure Investment in Africa.” 




the current bands.190 Though geography and other environmental variations will alter the 
architecture requirements, traditional telecommunication networks are largely regular 
shapes and the architecture is centralized around the base station. Due to a combination of 
capabilities and constraints of 5G standalone and legacy/5G hybrid networks, traditional 
cell architecture is no longer sufficient. Figure 12 shows the evolution that will occur from 
a base station centric network to the emerging user centric network.191  
 
Figure 12. Shift from Base Station Centric to User Centric Architecture192 
The frequency bands identified for 5G telecommunications technology paired with 
advances in waveform and end-device technology will introduce key differences in how 
the network architecture will likely be designed. As previously discussed, three distinct 
 
190 Konstantinos B. Baltzis, “Hexagonal vs Circular Cell Shape: A Comparative Analysis and 
Evaluation of the Two Popular Modeling Approximations,” in Cellular Networks, ed. Agassi Melikov 
(Rijeka: IntechOpen, 2011), 104, https://doi.org/10.5772/14851. 
191 Agiwal, Roy, and Saxena, “Next Generation 5G Wireless Networks: A Comprehensive Survey,” 
1620. 
192 Source: Agiwal, Roy, and Saxena, 1620. 
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bands (low, medium, and high) have been identified to potentially fulfill the requirements 
of 5G capabilities; however, the medium band (often referred to as sub-6) and high band 
(often referred to as mmWave) will drive many of the network advancements. Sub-6 bands, 
though generally higher frequency than the current 4G/LTE bands, are similar to our 
current capabilities, though they do offer some exciting boosts to speed, capacity, and 
connectivity. Alternatively, mmWave bands promise to fully realize the desired upgrades 
to capabilities despite drawbacks to the decreased propagation characteristics and increased 
interference of the mmWaves. To overcome the negative wave characteristics, future 5G 
networks will need to be much denser—to include the proliferation of macro, small, micro, 
pico, and femto cell deployments—but also more user centric.193 Illustrated in Figure 13, 
this transition to 5G will manifest itself in hybrid and standalone networks.194 
 
Figure 13. Standalone and Hybrid mmWave Network Architecture195 
These network architectures are not mutually exclusive. In fact, it is likely that 
hybrid and standalone architectures will provide discrete benefits to different regions based 
on the unique needs of each community. Most regions throughout the world and 
particularly large cities already have well-established 4G/LTE infrastructures built into 
 
193 Agiwal, Roy, and Saxena, 1621. 
194 Agiwal, Roy, and Saxena, 1621.  
195 Source: Agiwal, Roy, and Saxena, 1621. 
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their dense urban spaces. The transition to 5G will require a massive amount of bandwidth 
in an area plagued by signal interference; a hybrid network can bolt onto the existing 
infrastructure and still take advantage of the higher frequency bands, emerging smart 
antenna technology, and distributed networks enabled by edge computing.  
Alternatively, purposefully planned smart cities such as the Konza Technopolis in 
Kenya could benefit from standalone, heterogenous 5G networks.196 Although this project 
has stalled, the concept of Konza may be duplicated in the future due to infrastructure 
advantages; without competing legacy infrastructure constraints, a smart city can 
organically grow on a standalone 5G architecture.197 In either case, each network design 
will likely benefit from a Network Functions Virtualization (NFV)-based control and 
maintenance of RAN functions. In an NFV, physical, localized maintenance and control 
functions are replaced by a central, cloud-based tool capable of remotely monitoring, 
maintaining, updating, or fixing particular cells or entire networks. This will reduce 
operating costs via the deployment of generic, programmable hardware and centralizing 
the expensive network “brains.”198 
Utilizing several types of access technologies (e.g., cellular, Wi-Fi), multiple radio 
access technology (Multi-RAT)—shown in Figure 14—designs allow each unique 
architecture to connect into a unified framework and will be the backbone of emerging 5G 
and IoT architectures.199 Supporting the growing demand of smart cities, autonomous 
vehicles, and other IoT wireless capabilities, the network will be empowered by a wide 
range of cell stations and access points densely populated to provide massive amounts of 
data and super low latency to an incredible number of devices.200 
 
196 “Konza Technopolis: Smart City,” 2019, https://www.konza.go.ke/smart-city/. 
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Figure 14. Multi-RAT Integration201 
C. ANTENNAE: MMIMO, SPATIAL DIVERSITY/MULTIPLEXING AND 
BEAMFORMING 
A blended low, medium, and high band approach to 5G architecture will be enabled 
not only by the user centric and Multi-Rat architectures discussed previously, but also by 
advances in antenna technology. The shorter, high frequency waves proposed for the 
medium and high bands will require closer, line-of-sight signals to maintain a connection. 
However, the RF signal requires a much smaller antenna, allowing for many more antennae 
within a single cell and an increased number of connections within a geographic area. A 
dense layout of antennae combined with massive multiple input multiple output (mMIMO) 
technology and nimble antenna pathways to maintain adequate line-of-sight signal strength 
will ensure the incredible number of connections are supported.202 
mMIMO. For some time, networks have depended on both cells and devices to have 
MIMO capabilities; in other words, each end utilizes multiple antennae in conjunction with 
sophisticated algorithms to determine where the energy of the wave is focused as well as 
how the data is mapped by the endpoint.203 The compact size of sub-6 GHz and mmWave 
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antennae alone facilitate a greater number of connections, however, via spatial diversity, 
spatial multiplexing and beamforming techniques, the capabilities of mMIMO will be more 
important for the efficient use of the waveforms and the space they operate in. 
Spatial Diversity and Multiplexing. Within a very dense network, it is likely that 
signals will not only interfere with the environment but may also interfere with each other. 
Spatial diversity utilizes unique signal pathways to deconflict signals.204 Allowing for 
additional capacity within the network, spatial multiplexing (illustrated in Figure 15) is a 
technique which allows a single device to send multiple messages simultaneously along 
deconflicted pathways; rather than limiting transmission to a single pipeline, multiple 
pipelines are available, and the volume of data transferred is significantly increased.205 
 
Figure 15. Spatial Multiplexing206 
Beamforming. Beamforming is a technique linked to spatial diversity. Analogous 
to transitioning from a lightbulb to a laser beam, this method focuses the RF signal in three 
dimensions between base stations to end-devices, allowing for a narrower signal and 
deconfliction within the spectrum.207 Traditional base stations emit in sectors, roughly in 








relative geolocation of each device.208 As Figure 16 demonstrates, these devices are often 
mobile, yet beamforming allows for a focused signal to dynamically track and support each 
device.209 
 




210 Source: Qualcomm. 
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